Morlee Sales Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Co.
Cases that cite this one
77 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Ramas 808 LLC v. Abosefain, LLC (Nassau County District Court 2025)
- Manzo v. Patch Publishing Co., Inc. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
- Hugo Boss Fashions, Inc. & Hugo Boss Usa, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants v. Federal Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee (2d Cir. 2001)
- American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. v. Lehman Bros. (In re American Home Mortgage, Holdings, Inc.) (United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware 2008)
- McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. v. Vanguard Index Trust (District Court, S.D. New York 2001)
- Downes v. O'CONNELL (District Court, E.D. New York 2000)
- Novamedix, Limited v. Ndm Acquisition Corporation and Vesta Healthcare, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 1999)
- Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Hyundai Electronics Industries, Co. (District Court, E.D. Texas 1999)
- Asian Vegetable Research & Development Center v. Institute of International Education (District Court, S.D. New York 1996)
- Abbott Laboratories v. Unilever United States, Inc. (7th Cir. 1995)
- Kimmins Industrial Service Corporation v. Reliance Insurance Company, National Casualty Company, Landmark Insurance Company (2d Cir. 1994)
- 200 East 87th Street Associates v. MTS, Inc. (District Court, S.D. New York 1992)
- Curry Road Ltd. v. K Mart Corporation (2d Cir. 1990)
- Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Rjr Nabisco, Incorporated (2d Cir. 1990)
- Metropolitan Life Insurance v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. (2d Cir. 1990)
- Hunt Ltd. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. (2d Cir. 1989)
- Record Club of America, Incorporated, Cross-Appellant v. United Artists Records, Incorporated, Cross-Appellee (2d Cir. 1989)
- Federal Insurance v. Mallardi (District Court, S.D. New York 1988)
- Brick v. JC Bradford & Co., Inc. (District Court, District of Columbia 1987)
- Pollack v. Crocker (District Court, S.D. New York 1987)
- Francis v. INA Life Ins. Co. of New York (District Court, S.D. New York 1986)
- Doris Filner v. Samuel Shapiro and Southwestern Alloys Corporation (2d Cir. 1980)
- Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Kennecott Corp. (District Court, S.D. New York 1980)
- Reed v. Knollwood Park Cemetery, Inc. (District Court, E.D. New York 1977)
- Ray Slotkin v. Edward W. Willmering (8th Cir. 1972)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
The issue here is whether the Manufacturers Trust Company, as purchaser of the property, was authorized, under paragraph 18 of the lease, to give notice of cancellation in the absence of a resale of the property by it. Paragraph 18 provides: ‘ ‘ That if the Landlord should sell said premises, prior to the expiration of this lease and the purchaser thereof desires possession of said premises, then and in that event, the Tenant will cancel this lease and surrender possession of said premises, and will execute an instrument to effect a proper cancellation of this lease and surrender of the demised premises upon receiving 60 days written notice of the cancellation of this lease, by registered mail addressed to the Tenant to the premises herein demised, and the security deposited with the Landlord as aforementioned shall be returned to the Tenant.” (Italics supplied.)
On August 1,1957 respondent Morlee entered into a five-year lease with the Ave. D. Building Co., Inc., the then landlord of the leased premises now under consideration. In addition to the
The Supreme Court, concluding that this exact issue was decided by Matter of Furio v. Smith (272 App. Div. 941), found itself constrained to dismiss the dispossess proceeding and grant judgment in Morlee’s favor. The Appellate Division affirmed on the authority of 112 East 36th St. Holding Corp. v. Daffos (273 App. Div. 447, affd. 298 N. Y. 763) and Matter of Furio v. Smith (supra).
We do not think that the rationale of Daffos supports the decision below, and believe that the reasoning attributed to the cases cited in Furio should not be followed.
It is axiomatic that a contract is to be interpreted so as to give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the unequivocal language employed (Green v. Doniger, 300 N. Y. 238; Hartigan v. Casualty Co. of America, 227 N. Y. 175). The courts may not by construction add or excise terms, nor distort the meaning of those used and thereby “make a new contract for the parties under the guise of interpreting the writing.”
Since the lease itself does not indicate who shall give notice, it seems only logical that the parties would intend that the purchaser be allowed to perform the required task (see Scheele v. Waldman, 136 App. Div. 679). It cannot be read to require the landlord to terminate the lease, and thereby part with a tenant before the landlord is assured that title will close. In any event we should not imply a restriction which the parties chose not to insert in the contract. (Raner v. Goldberg, 244 N. Y. 438, 442.)
Moreover, it is our opinion that the cases cited to substantiate the rationale of the Furio case (supra) are distinguishable either because they involve the construction of cancellation clauses which specifically identify the person to give notice, e.g., the landlord, lessor, etc., or because the purchaser waived his right to give notice by assuming the posture of the landlord (e.g., by waiting an unreasonable time, or accepting rent before giving notice). If there is an attornment, and the purchaser acknowledges the tenancy, certainly he would waive whatever rights he may have had to give notice. This type waiver was precise ground for our affirmance of the Appellate Division in the Daffos ease (supra). (See Basiliko Inv. Corp. v. United Gigar-Whelan Stores Corp., 168 F. 2d 567.)
In the case at bar, however, the Bank, in our opinion, gave timely notice and did nothing inconsistent with its election as purchaser. Three weeks after acquiring title, and prior to the collection of any rent from Morlee, the Bank duly notified Morlee.
Accordingly, the judgment and order should be reversed, with costs in all courts, and the matter remitted to Special Term for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein.
Chief Judge Desmond and Judges Dye, Fuld, Fboessel, Van Voorhis and Foster concur.
Judgment accordingly.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.