Ross v. Pawtucket Mutual Insurance
Cases that cite this one
8 later published cases cite this decision.
- Pandora Industries, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc. (In re Wingspread Corp.) (District Court, S.D. New York 1992)
- Bunge Corp. v. London & Overseas Insurance (District Court, S.D. New York 1965)
- LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY v. Borden Company (District Court, S.D. New York 1965)
- Philip Morris Companies, Inc. v. Federal Insurance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1997)
- Fowler v. Pebble Hill Building Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1986)
- Cassell Vacation Homes, Inc. v. Commercial Union Insurance Companies (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1986)
- Seven Sixty Travel, Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance (New York Supreme Court 1979)
- Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. State (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1977)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
An automobile owned by Nat Boss was damaged in a collision with one owned by Tillie Moss and operated by her husband. The defendant insurance company had issued a policy insuring Boss’ car against collision and, when Boss and the company were unable to agree as to the amount of damages, a suit was instituted by Boss upon the policy. . After answering the complaint, the insurance company served a third-party complaint against Maurice and Tillie Moss, alleging that it was their negligence which caused the collision. Upon motion made pursuant to rule 106 of the former Buies of Civil Practice, the Special Term dismissed the third-party complaint, holding that the insurer had no right to prosecute the action in negligence before the payment of the insured’s claim.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed that dismissal. We granted permission to appeal in view of an apparently conflicting conclusion reached by the Appellate Division, First Department (Madison Ave. Props. Corp. v. Royal Ins. Co., 281 App. Div. 641).
The issue presented, therefore, is whether an insurer, upon being sued by its insured upon the policy, may implead in a negligence action the alleged tort-feasors. Its resolution rests upon' the nature of the subrogation right and the terms of the policy itself.
Section 193-a of the former Civil Practice Act (see CPLB 1007) permits a defendant to implead a person “ who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him ”. The policy itself, however, provides that the insurer is
We must disagree with this contention, for the rationale of our decisions in American Sur. Co. v. Diamond (1 N Y 2d 594) and Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Wood (8 N Y 2d 409) precludes such an interpretation. In both of the above-cited cases, although in neither was the insurer a 11 named defendant ’ ’, we reasoned that the insurers, not having made any payments under the policies involved, were not subrogated to the rights of their insureds, and, accordingly, had no standing to press cross complaints (American Sur. Co. v. Diamond, 1 N Y 2d 594, 598, supra; Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Wood, 8 N Y 2d 409, 412, supra; see McGrath v. Carnegie Trust Co., 221 N. Y. 92; American Sur. Co. v. Palmer, 240 N. Y. 63). Since the insurer in this case has not made any payments under the policy, it has not acquired the right or color of a present cause of action. Therefore, because of the contingent nature of the right of subrogation, the attempt by the insurance company, as a third-party plaintiff, to prosecute its insured’s cause of action in negligence was premature.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, without costs.
Chief Judge Desmond and Judges Dye, Fuld, Van Voorhis, Berks and Scileppi concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.