New York Court of Appeals, 1969

Friedman v. City of New York

New York Court of Appeals · Decided June 4, 1969

25 N.Y.2d 764; 250 N.E.2d 575; 303 N.Y.S.2d 515; 1969 N.Y. LEXIS 1219

Cases that cite this one

8 later published cases cite this decision.

Witherspoon v. Columbia University (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
Landsiedel v. Consolidated Edison Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1989)
Capelli v. Prudential Building Maintenance (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1984)
Van Stry v. State (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1984)
Heyden v. Gallagher Elevator Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1983)
Wozniak v. 110 South Main Street Land & Development Improvement Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1978)
Koles v. Penn Central Co. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1977)
Kelsey v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1976)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

Memorandum. The plaintiff, a 72-year-old woman, was injured when she attempted to step across a hole in the sidewalk on the inside of the curb edge at a crosswalk. The hole, about a foot and a half wide and three or four inches deep, was the *765result of defendant’s work in repaving a seven-block area in Brooklyn and the defendant had failed to place any warning signs around the hole and had failed to place any covering over the hole. The injury occurred when the plaintiff was returning from shopping and attempted to find a portion of the sidewalk which was unbroken and which would permit her to cross at the corner rather than in the middle of the block. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff but the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed on the law and the facts and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law in that she had earlier successfully used an alternate way of crossing the street and was fully conscious of the risks involved in attempting to step across the obvious hole. On these facts, however, both the question of defendants’ negligence and the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence were for the jury since plaintiff’s knowledge of the danger and the presence of an alternate route were circumstances from which the jury might or might not infer negligence on the part of the plaintiff (Meyer v. West End Equities, 12 N Y 2d 698, revg. 13 A D 2d 938; Cesario v. Chiapparine, 21 A D 2d 272). Since reasonable men could differ as to whether or not the inference of negligence should be drawn in these circumstances, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent and a new trial is, therefore, required.

Judges Burke, Bergan, Breitel and Jasen concur; Chief Judge Fuld and Judge Scileppi dissent and vote to affirm.

Order reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.

Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.