People v. Bush
Cases that cite this one
11 later published cases cite this decision.
- Jackson v. Fogg (District Court, S.D. New York 1978)
- People v. Morales (N.Y. 1975)
- Edmond Jackson v. Walter Fogg, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility, Respondent (2d Cir. 1978)
- Eugene Twitty v. Harold J. Smith, Superintendent, Attica Correctional Facility, Respondent (2d Cir. 1979)
- People v. Olsen (New York Supreme Court 1979)
- People v. Bonomo (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1975)
- People v. Dalton (N.Y. 1976)
- People ex rel. Wright v. Smith (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1975)
- People v. Caserta (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1991)
- People v. Everett (New York Supreme Court 1983)
- People v. Simone (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1975)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
We find no significant difference between section 295-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, applicable here, and the notice-of-alibi statute of the State of Oregon held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Wardius v. Oregon (412 U. S. 470). Accordingly we hold section 295-1 unconstitutional.
We recognize, however, “ the principle that in criminal litigation concerning constitutional claims, ‘ the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule prospective ’ ” (Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 726). In our view section 295-1 as applied in this instance did not operate to exclude testimony. In response to the District Attorney’s demand, defendant here furnished the names of his alibi witnesses. Their testimony was admitted on trial, as was that of the prosecution’s rebuttal witnesses. The statute operated only to deny defendant advance notice of the identity of these rebuttal witnesses, and to this extent to hinder his preparation to impeach, discredit or rebut their testimony. He was not, however, inhibited in his own opportunity by direct evidence to establish his alibi. The infringement of defendant’s rights went only to a collateral though not unimportant issue. Thus, we conclude that on this record the operation of the rule did not go to “ the very integrity of the fact-finding process ”; rather it touched on procedural fairness to defendant.
On the basis of this evaluation we hold that Wardius and our present decision shall apply to cases in which the trial began after June 11, 1973, the date of the Supreme Court decision in Wardius (cf. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406; Johnson v. New Jersey, supra; Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293; see People ex rel. Cadogan v. McMann, 24 U S 2d 233), but shall not apply to cases where the trial began prior to that date, unless, as occurred in Wardius but unlike the situation here, the rule was applied to prevent a defendant from introducing testimony to support his alibi defense as a sanction for his failure to comply with the notice-of-alibi statute.
We have examined appellant’s other contentions and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly the order of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
Judges Burke, Breitel, Jasen, Gabbielli, Jones and Waohtler concur in Per Curiam opinion; Chief Judge Fuld taking no part.
Order affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.