New York Court of Appeals, 1974

Young v. Board of Education of Central School District No. 6

New York Court of Appeals · Decided July 11, 1974 · Jasen

35 N.Y.2d 31; 315 N.E.2d 768; 358 N.Y.S.2d 709; 1974 N.Y. LEXIS 1388

Cases that cite this one

42 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.

Ballato v. Board of Education (Conn. App. Ct. 1993)
Winter v. Board of Education (N.Y. 1992)
Gross v. Board of Education (N.Y. 1991)
Decatur Board of Education v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
Zurlo v. Ambach (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1980)
Matter of City of Troy (Troy Police Benevolent & Protective Assn., Inc.) (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2021)
Matter of Lucas v. Board of Educ. of the E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2020)
Matter of Razzano v. Remsenburg-Speonk UFSD (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2018)
In re the Arbitration between Buffalo Council of Supervisors & Administrators & Board of Education of City School District (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
Madison-Oneida Board of Cooperative Educational Services v. Mills (N.Y. 2004)
DiPiazza v. Board of Education (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1995)
Girard v. Board of Education of City School District of City of Buffalo (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1991)
Johnson v. Board of Education (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1989)
In re Tameka S. (NYC Family Court 1989)
Mahopac Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Education of Mahopac Central School District (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1988)
Anderson v. Board of Cooperative Educational Services (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1987)
Gagnon v. Board of Education of Manhasset Union Free School District (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1986)
Schimmel v. Board of Education (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1985)
Rappold v. Board of Education (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1983)
Roman v. Tompkins-Seneca-Tioga Board of Cooperative Educational Services (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1983)
Spindel v. Bellmore-Merrick Central High School District (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1982)
Smalls v. Board of Education (Civil Court of the City of New York 1982)
Connolly v. Carey (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1981)
Currier v. Tompkins-Seneca-Tioga Board of Cooperative Educational Services (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1981)
Lindsey v. Board of Education (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1980)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

Jasen, J.

We are called upon to decide whether, consistent with the teacher tenure and compulsory education provisions of the Education Law, a school district may abolish the position of attendance teacher and divide the duties of the position among principals and assistant principals in the school district.

On September 1, 1961, the respondent Board of Education appointed the petitioner to the position of attendance teacher in the Harborfields School District. For some years prior to that time, such duties had been performed either by the principals of the school district or by an attendance teacher retained on a half-time basis through the Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES). By resolution dated July 7, 1964, after having satisfactorily served the statutory three-year probationary period, petitioner was accorded tenure as an attend*34anee teacher. In February, 1972, after evaluating the position and determining that a full-time attendance .teacher was no longer required, the board abolished the. position, effective July 1, 1972. The duties of the position were thereafter divided among the existing principals and assistant principals in the school district. Petitioner was then placed on a preferred eligibility list entitling him to reinstatement if within four years there arose a vacancy in the position of attendance teacher or a similar position.

Special Term held that abolishing petitioner’s position and assigning its duties to other school district employees violated petitioner’s tenure rights. The respondent Board of Education was ordered to restore petitioner to the position of attendance teacher, be it full time or part-time. A unanimous Appellate Division, finding no bar to abolishing the position of attendance teacher and consolidating its duties with those of pre-existing positions, reversed and dismissed the petition. We affirm.

Faced with spiraling operating costs and ever increasing demands on their tax bases, school districts must have sufficient latitude within the law to manage their affairs efficiently and effectively. This implies, where appropriate, the power to consolidate and abolish positions for economic reasons. (See Education Law, § 1709, subds. 16, 33; § 1804, subd. 1.) Here, the Board of Education abolished petitioner’s position and transferred its duties to the existing positions of principal and assistant principal within the district, action we find not inconsistent with petitioner’s tenure rights. Had a new or part-time position been created to carry on the work formerly done by petitioner, a different question would be presented. (See Education Law, §§ 2510, 2585; Matter of Baron v. Mackreth, 30 A D 2d 810, affd. 26 N Y 2d 1039.) But such is not the case here. In accordance with the law (Education Law, §§ 2510, 2585), petitioner was assigned preferred status entitling him to reinstatement should a vacancy occur within four years in his former position or a similar one. Within the intendment of the law, his tenure rights have been adequately safeguarded.

Nor, on the record before us, do we find any impairment of the compulsory education provisions of the law. By express provision of the Education Law (§ 3205, subd. 1, par. a), minors aged 6 to 16 must attend full-time instruction. “ To the end *35that children shall not suffer through unnecessary failure to attend school for any cause whatsoever ” (Education Law, § 3213, subd. 1, pár. a), school districts are empowered to appoint and to remove supervisors of attendance and attendance teachers whose duty it is to enforce the compulsory education provisions of the law. (Education Law, § 3212, subd. 5, par. b; § 3213, subds. 1, 2.) While the position of attendance teacher has been abolished, the duties have been continued in the principals and assistant principals of the school district. Were the duties also abolished, a different question would be presented. Each principal and assistant principal is licensed to teach and satisfies the minimum requirement of subdivision 1 of section 3213 of the Education Law that a person who performs as an attendance teacher be “ a teacher licensed to teach in New York state ”. Moreover, there has been no showing that the principals and assistant principals are unable to perform these duties adequately. On the record before us, we find no impairment of the compulsory education provisions of the law.

Petitioner’s other points for reversal have been considered and found to be without merit. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

Chief Judge Bbeitel and Judges Gabrielli, Jobes, Wachtler and Stevebs concur; Judge Rabib taking no part.

Order affirmed.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.