Aridas v. Caserta
Aridas v. Caserta
Opinion of the Court
Memorandum. Plaintiff’s appeal from so much of the order at the Appellate Division as severed the actions against defendants Charlene B. Caserta, the driver of the automobile that struck plaintiff, and Elwood Union Free School District No. 1 and granted a new trial of plaintiff’s claims against them should be dismissed on the court’s own motion, without costs, on the ground that that portion of the order does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution (NY Const, art VI, § 3, subd [a]; CPLR 5601, subd [a], par [ii]).
To the extent that the order of the Appellate Division reversed the judgment in favor of plaintiff against Long Island Bus Co., Inc., it should be affirmed, with costs to the bus company against plaintiff. The only theory advanced for the claim of negligence on the part of the bus company is predicated on the provisions of subdivision 20 of section 375 of the
Finally we observe that we cannot hold it to have been error that the Appellate Division chose, after dismissing defendants’ first appeal on the issue of liability for failure to prosecute, to entertain consideration of the same issue on the second appeal. Every court retains a continuing jurisdiction generally to reconsider any prior intermediate determination it has made. We cannot say that the Appellate Division’s exercise of its reserved power in this instance was error as a matter of law (cf. Bray v Cox, 38 NY2d 350).
Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Cooke concur in memorandum.
On plaintiffs appeal from so much of the order of the Appellate Division as severed the action against defendants Casería and school district and granted a new trial: Appeal dismissed, without costs.
On plaintiffs appeal from so much of the order of the Appellate Division as dismissed the complaint as against Long Island Bus Co., Inc.: Order affirmed, with costs to defendant Long Island Bus Co., Inc., against plaintiff.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.