New York Court of Appeals, 1979

Johnson v. Joy

New York Court of Appeals · Decided October 11, 1979

48 N.Y.2d 689; 397 N.E.2d 746; 422 N.Y.S.2d 56; 1979 N.Y. LEXIS 2350

Cases that cite this one

75 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.

Soler v. G & U, Inc. (District Court, S.D. New York 1991)
Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC v. State (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
Whitehill v. New York State Teachers' Retirement System (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1988)
People v. Williams (New York Supreme Court 1986)
McKernan v. City of New York Civil Service Commission (New York Supreme Court 1985)
Matter of AAG Mgt., Inc. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2024)
The People v. Marc Mitchell (N.Y. 2022)
Cronk v. King (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
Cronk v. King (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2015)
Hyman v. Cornell University (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
People v. Andujar (Criminal Court of the City of New York 2011)
Posada v. New York State Department of Health (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
Aides At Home, Inc. v. State of New York Workers' Compensation Board (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2010)
Koebel v. ew York State Comptroller (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
Pletcher v. New York State Racing & Wagering Board (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
Rochdale Village, Inc. v. New York City Water Board (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
Skyline Specialty, Inc. v. Gargano (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
19 W. 36th Holding Corp. v. Parker (Civil Court of the City of New York 2002)
Trea v. New York State Department of Transportation (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1999)
Board of Education of the City School District v. Mills (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1998)
Brown v. Wing (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1998)
Lincoln West Partners, L.P. v. Department of Housing Preservation & Development (New York Supreme Court 1998)
Rogers v. New York City Transit Authority (N.Y. 1997)
902 Associates v. New York City Loft Board (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1996)
Wisseman v. New York State Board of Equalization & Assessment (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1995)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The petitioner tenants’ protest, which the commissioner denied, is based on the argument that with respect to a rent increase resulting from rehabilitation of housing accommodations with government assisted financing, once the commissioner grants an increase he is, as to that ground for allowing an increase, functus officio. That contention is predicated upon the words "individual adjustment of maximum rents” in section Y51-5.0 (subd g, par [1]) of the Administrative Code and the words "an appropriate adjustment” in section 33.9 of the city Rent, Eviction and Rehabilitation Regulations.

The Administrative Code language cannot be so construed, for the obvious purpose of the quoted words, which appear in the preamble to a number of subdivisions providing various means by which rents may be increased, is that each adjustment shall be considered separately or individually. The word "individual” in the context of the preamble cannot reasonably be read as "one and only one”.

The words "an appropriate adjustment” in the regulations present a closer question for they are expressed in the singu*691lar. We are, however, admonished by section 35 of the General Construction Law that "[w]ords in the singular number include the plural”.* Petitioners’ construction limiting the commissioner to but one increase ignores the word "appropriate” and the purpose behind the rehabilitation provision, upon which the Appellate Division relied and which would be denigrated were it to be held that the commissioner, having concluded on the basis of figures presented to him that the increase first granted was not "appropriate” because insufficient, nevertheless could not modify it because the regulation speaks only of "an * * * adjustment”. When the three words on which petitioners rely are read in context and in light of the purpose of the regulation, the commissioner’s construction of the regulation is clearly reasonable (see People v Gates, 56 NY 387; cf. Culver v Title Guar. & Trust Co., 296 NY 74, 78). It is, moreover, hornbook law that the construction given statutes and regulations by the agency responsible for their administration will, if not irrational or unreasonable, be upheld (Matter of Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434, 438).

Petitioners’ notice argument is based not on due process but on the provisions of the regulations and the concept that since the increase could not be granted under section 33.9 it must necessarily have been granted under section 33.5 as a hardship increase, which under the regulations would require notice to tenants. As above noted, the premise of that contention does not withstand analysis.

The order of the Appellate Division reinstating the commissioner’s order denying petitioners’ protest should, accordingly, be affirmed.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Meyer concur.

Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.

While applicable in terms only to statutes section 110 of the General Construction Law may be used by analogy in the construction of the regulations here in issue (see People ex rel. Hart v Goodrich, 92 App Div 445, affd on opn below 180 NY 522).

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.