Incorporated Village of Old Westbury v. All-Jay Farms, Inc.
Cases that cite this one
16 later published cases cite this decision.
- In re Stowe Club Highlands (Vt. 1996)
- Matter of Sand Land Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Southampton (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Subdivisions, Inc. v. Town of Sullivan (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Costa v. Callahan (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Incorporated Village of Sag Harbor v. Rocco's (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
- Squire v. Conway (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1998)
- People v. Island Wide Insurance Brokerage, Inc. (Nassau County District Court 1998)
- Watral v. Scheyer (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1996)
- Keller v. Haller (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1996)
- Berchielli v. Zoning Board of Appeals (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1994)
- Town of Brookhaven v. Spadaro (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1994)
- Moody Hill Farms, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of North East (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1993)
- Town of Virgil v. Ford (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1990)
- Province of Meribah Society of Mary, Inc. v. Village of Muttontown (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1989)
- Rembar v. Board of Appeals of East Hampton (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1989)
- Iazzetti v. Village of Tuxedo Park (New York Supreme Court 1989)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
*800 OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The order of the Appellate Division should be modified, with costs, to declare that defendants have a valid nonconforming use accessory to their single-family dwelling for the maintenance of defendants’ own horses, even though they be racing horses, on the property and, as so modified, should be affirmed.
We agree with the Appellate Division, for the reasons stated in its memorandum (100 AD2d 574), that defendants do not have a legal nonconforming use for a commercial horse farm, and conclude that defendants have not sustained their heavy burden of demonstrating that the distinction made in the zoning ordinance between farms for the raising of cattle and crops and farms for horse breeding and training is unconstitutional.
On the other hand, the record shows that horses were maintained on the property as an accessory use prior to the enactment of the present ordinance. At the time the ordinance was enacted this was a preexisting use. That use cannot now be expanded to conform with the owner’s desire to maintain a commercial breeding farm; however, the maintaining of defendants’ horses, even though they be racing horses, on the property cannot be precluded.
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Jasen, Meyer, Simons, Kaye and Alexander concur.
Order modified, with costs to appellants, in accordance with the memorandum herein and, as so modified, affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.