New York Court of Appeals, 1986

People v. Jones

New York Court of Appeals · Decided July 8, 1986

68 N.Y.2d 717; 497 N.E.2d 682; 506 N.Y.S.2d 315; 1986 N.Y. LEXIS 19488

Cases that cite this one

20 later published cases cite this decision.

People v. Apodoca (New York Supreme Court 1992)
Toney v. State (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988)
People v. Myers (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1991)
People v. Franco (Kinderhook Justice Court 2016)
People v. Headley (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
People v. Headley (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
People v. Lopez (Criminal Court of the City of New York 1996)
People v. Lourens (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1994)
People v. Thomas (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1994)
People v. Boyd (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1993)
People v. Buckley (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1992)
People v. Caussade (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1990)
People v. Williams (New York Supreme Court 1990)
People v. Kyser (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1989)
People v. Greenfield (New York Supreme Court 1989)
People v. Richardson (New York Supreme Court 1989)
People v. Shannon (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1987)
People v. Coker (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1987)
People v. Amendolara (New York Supreme Court 1987)
People v. Weigand-Gordon (New York Supreme Court 1987)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the indictment dismissed.

Lengthy postreadiness delays attributable to defendant do not constitute an "exceptional fact or circumstance” within the meaning of CPL 30.30 (3) (b) sufficient to excuse adjournments resulting from the trial assistant’s planned European vacation. Such an adjournment, here amounting to 28 days, is clearly chargeable to the People (see, e.g., People v Warren, 85 AD2d 747 [shortage of personnel]; People v McCaffery, 78 AD2d 1003 [illness of prosecutor]), especially, as here, where the record suggests that another trial assistant could have been substituted.

Nor do defendant’s postreadiness delays, even though totaling some 17 months, constitute an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of CPL 30.30 (3) (b). "[I]t is the People’s *719delay alone that is to be considered, except where that delay directly 'results from’ action taken by the defendant” (People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 536). Here, although defendant was responsible for substantial periods of postreadiness delay, the People were also chargeable with 164 days of prereadiness delay, and there simply is no causal relationship between defendant’s postreadiness delay and the trial assistant’s vacation; nor is there any claim of bad faith on defendant’s part. The People are, thus, chargeable with 192 days delay (164 plus 28), which exceeds the six months allowed by CPL 30.30 (1) (a).

Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Meyer, Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Titone and Hancock, Jr., concur in memorandum.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.4 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.4), order reversed, etc.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.