Reis v. New York State Housing Finance Agency
Cases that cite this one
9 later published cases cite this decision.
- Easling v. Odessa-Montour Central School District (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- Hill v. City of New York (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1990)
- Matter of Russell v. New York State Ins. Fund (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2020)
- Ortiz v. Manhattan Psychiatric Center (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2006)
- Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. State of New York Department of Civil Service (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1998)
- Grant v. New York State Office of Mental Health (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1995)
- Matter of Vill. of Nissequogue v. Suffolk County Dep't of Civil Serv. (N.Y. 1991)
- Village of Nissequogue v. Suffolk County Department of Civil Service (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1990)
- Atkinson v. Koch (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1990)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The judgment appealed from and the order of the Appellate Division brought up for review should be reversed, without costs, and the petition dismissed against respondent Agency.
Petitioner’s probationary period commenced on the date he was appointed a permanent employee, February 7, 1985, not the date he passed the qualifying examination, December 18, 1984 (Civil Service Law § 61). Accordingly, petitioner was not entitled to the protection of the provisions of Civil Service
In holding that the December date controlled, the Appellate Division relied on our decision in Matter of Montero v Lum (68 NY2d 253). In that case, the petitioner contended that the one-year period should be measured from the date of his temporary appointment. We rejected that contention, holding that the one-year period could not commence until the applicant became eligible for permanent appointment, which could only occur after successful completion of the qualifying examination. Coincidentally, the date of petitioner Montero’s permanent appointment and the examination date were the same and so we spoke of the date of the examination to distinguish it from the date of the temporary appointment. Our decision in Montero did not change the statutorily fixed rule that the date of permanent appointment controls for purposes of measuring the probationary period.
Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Simons, Kaye, Alexander, Titone, Hancock, Jr., and Bellacosa concur in memorandum.
Judgment appealed from and order of the Appellate Division brought up for review, reversed, etc.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.