Matter of Tabitha LL.
Cases that cite this one
17 later published cases cite this decision.
- In re Libby G. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2000)
- In re of Sarah G. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- In re Karis OO. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2011)
- In re Jennifer QQ. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- In re Jamel A. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- In re Investigation No. 04-730 (New York County Courts 2005)
- Matter of Robert J. (N.Y. 2004)
- In re Crystal A. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- In re Todd Z. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- In re Jodi VV. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- In re Samantha T. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2002)
- In re Atiba Andrew B. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2000)
- In re Chad H. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2000)
- In re Mark J. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1999)
- In re Daniel H. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1997)
- In re Randy SS. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1996)
- In re Jamie EE. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1996)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.
Respondent was adjudicated a person in need of supervision (PINS) in a Family Court Act article 7 proceeding. At her arraignment, respondent was assigned counsel and initially advised of her right to remain silent, as required by Family Court Act § 741. However, she was not accorded the procedural safeguards embodied in Family Court Act § 321.3, the article governing juvenile delinquency proceedings. She argues on this appeal that Family Court’s failure to follow these procedures before she entered an admission on the charges constitutes reversible error. We disagree.
Article 3 explicitly requires that the Family Court advise a respondent that by making an admission he or she is waiving the right to a fact-finding hearing, and ascertain that respondent is aware of the possible specific dispositional orders (Fam *1011 ily Court Act § 321.3 [1]). There is no comparable provision in article 7. There is no legislative history or rule of statutory construction that would permit us to read into article 7 an express provision of article 3. * As respondent was sufficiently advised of her rights to the extent required under Family Court Act § 741, she received all the protection required by the statute. Respondent’s constitutional arguments are unpreserved for our review. Under the circumstances, her admissions were not invalid.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concur.
Order affirmed, without costs, in a memorandum.
To the extent Matter of Jacqueline P. (149 AD2d 933), Matter of Rickey B. (158 AD2d 1002), and Matter of Christopher W. (154 AD2d 937) are to the contrary, they are not to be followed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.