Alca Industries, Inc. v. Delaney
Cases that cite this one
30 later published cases cite this decision. The 25 that cite it most often are listed here.
- Missry v. Ehlich (Civil Court of the City of New York 2003)
- Plainview-Old Bethpage Congress of Teachers v. New York State Health Insurance Plan (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- Plainview-Old Bethpage Congress of Teachers v. New York State Health Insurance Plan (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2016)
- In the Matter of Maureen Kigin v. State of New York Workers' Compensation Board (N.Y. 2014)
- Council of City v. Department of Homeless Services (N.Y. 2013)
- Partee v. Evans (New York Supreme Court 2013)
- Kahrmann v. Crime Victims Board (New York Supreme Court 2006)
- Matter of Gui Zhu Chen v. Reardon (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2026)
- Boundless Energy NE, LLC v. Public Service Commission (New York Supreme Court 2017)
- the Texas Education Agency and Mike Morath, Commissioner of Education, in His Official Capacity v. Academy of Careers and Technologies, Inc. D/B/A Academy of Careers and Technologies Charter School (Tex. App. 2015)
- PINNACLE CHARTER SCHOOL v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY, OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Pinnacle Charter School v. Board of Regents of University (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Pinnacle Charter School v. Board of Regents of University (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2013)
- Morris v. New York State Department of Corrections & Community Supervision (New York Supreme Court 2013)
- Homestead Funding Corp. v. State (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Homestead Funding Corp. v. State (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2012)
- Rye Psychiatric Hospital Center, Inc. v. New York State Office of Mental Health (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2009)
- Frank v. Stevens (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2008)
- 9th & 10th Street L.L.C. v. Board of Standards & Appeals (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Harding v. Calogero (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2007)
- Chavis v. New York Temporary State Commission on Lobbying (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2005)
- Lue-Shing v. Travis (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2004)
- Arkansas Pharmacist's Ass'n v. Arkansas State & Public School Life & Health Insurance Board (Ark. 2003)
- Medical Society v. Serio (N.Y. 2003)
- New York State Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Noveleo (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 2003)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
In this case, Alca Industries petitions to have the Office of General Services (OGS) return its $11,800 bid security. As required by the OGS bid advertisement for an oil separator project, and in conjunction with its bid, Alca had provided this security in the form of a bid bond. The day after OGS opened the bids, however, it became apparent that Alca had failed to include an allowance for “washwater treatment equipment,” a component specified in the project manual accompanying the bid advertisement. Alca immediately requested that it be allowed to withdraw its bid and that OGS return its bid security. OGS considered this request in light of the bid withdrawal criteria set forth in the instructions and determined that Alca had failed to show that the mistake occurred in “the absence of negligence in the preparation of the bid.” As a result, OGS retained the bid security.
In the petition seeking to overturn OGS’s determination, Alca argued that the OGS bid withdrawal criteria and procedures were “rules” within the meaning of article 2 of the State Administrative Procedure Act, and absent promulgation in compliance with the State Administrative Procedure Act
Key to our reversal is the distinction between ad hoc decision making based on individual facts and circumstances, and rulemaking, meaning “any kind of legislative or quasi-legislative norm or prescription which establishes a pattern or course of conduct for the future” (People v Cull, 10 NY2d 123, 126). The State Administrative Procedure Act defines a “rule” as “the whole or part of each agency statement, regulation or code of general applicability that implements or applies law, or prescribes a fee charged by or paid to any agency or the procedure or practice requirements of any agency” (State Administrative Procedure Act § 102 [2] [emphasis added]). Choosing to take an action or write a contract based on individual circumstances is significantly different from implementing a standard or procedure that directs what action should be taken regardless of individual circumstances. Rulemaking, in other words, sets standards that substantially alter or, in fact, can determine the result of future agency adjudications.
The case law illustrates this distinction. Administrative orders establishing a speed limit were “rules” required to be filed with the Secretary of State because they “plainly establish[ed] a general course of operation to be effective for the future” (People v Cull, supra, 10 NY2d, at 127). Similarly, a blanket requirement regarding where and when service of a suspension for an infraction must be made was a rule subject to the State Administrative Procedure Act’s rule-making procedures (Matter of Cordero v Corbisiero, 80 NY2d 771). Likewise, a Department of Labor procedure, uniformly applied, which required that previous overpayments of unemployment insurance benefits always be recouped by deducting 50% of the amount of future payments, was a rule (Matter of Schwartfigure v Hartnett, 83 NY2d 296).
In contrast, agency penalty guidelines that “vest inspectors with significant discretion, and allow for flexibility in the imposition of penalties, all with the view of imposing the appropriate sanction for the individual offense and offender in the particular case” are not rules under the State Administra
In light of the distinction drawn in the cases, there can be little doubt that OGS was not acting in its quasi-legislative rule-making capacity when it decided to include the withdrawal criteria in its bid advertisement for this project, but rather in its discretionary capacity. Far from setting a general standard of conduct, the withdrawal criteria only purported to cover the bidding for a particular contract. Nothing in the record indicates that these same bid withdrawal criteria were required for any and all contract bidding. To the contrary, the bid withdrawal procedures were selected each time to be a part of each bid package. As is true for each project, and as evidenced by the project manual in this case, OGS must determine what specifications and requirements are necessary for each project.
Unlike Matter of J. D. Posillico, Inc. v Department of Transp. (160 AD2d 1113), in which the Honest Error Review Unit of the Department of Transportation applied fixed standards for all contract bidding, here the “force and authority” of the bid withdrawal procedures stem solely from the fact that OGS selected them for this bid invitation, which Alca agreed to when it submitted its bid (see, Matter of Williams v Smith, supra). Since Alca’s rights and remedies were entirely determined on the basis of bidding conditions to which it had assented, no policy of OGS can be said to have been “completely conclusive of the rights and remedies of the affected party,” requiring promulgation as a rule (Matter of Roman Catholic Diocese v New York State Dept. of Health, supra, 109 AD2d, at 147 [dissenting in part opn], revd on dissenting opn below 66 NY2d 948).
Although OGS might have followed the course taken by the Department of Transportation in Posillico and adopted fixed bid withdrawal standards, nothing compelled it to do so. Indeed, the statute authorizing OGS to take bids on public work contracts grants discretion in determining what should
Nor does our decision deprive contractors of notice. To be sure, one of the principal problems addressed by the filing requirements of the State Administrative Procedure Act and the New York Constitution was that there were “no public rules or regulations of the departments of which the public generally ha[d] any notice” (2 Revised Record of Constitutional Convention of 1938, at 1429 [Statement of Senator Fearon]). Here, Alca could conform its bid to OGS expectations and standards, and it knew precisely what circumstances would result in forfeiture of its bid deposit. Appearing at the beginning of the bid instructions, the bid withdrawal procedures were there for any contractor interested in the project to read. Having submitted the bid based on this invitation, Alca cannot complain about a lack of notice of the conditions contained within it.
As the Supreme Court expressly did not review the remaining contentions in Alca’s petition, we remit to that court.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Bellacosa, Smith, Levine, Wesley and Rosenblatt concur.
Order reversed, etc.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.