In re the Guardianship of Putney
Opinion of the Court
Edwin O.Putney was appointed guardian of the person and estate of his infant son, Levi E. Putney, on the 30th day of September, 1891. The petition alleges that the total estate of said infant, consisting of personal property, did not exceed in value the sum of $700. The infant, at that time, was of the age of four years, his mother having died in the month of August, 1887.
It appears from the evidence in the case that, after the appointment of the petitioner as guardian, as aforesaid, and about the year 1893, he received the sum of $570'.88, constituting the entire estate of said minor. Ho other funds s came into the hands of the guardian belonging to said estate.
It does not appear that any application was ever made by the guardian to the Surrogate’s Court for permission to use any portion of the principal of said estate for the support and maintenance of said minor. It does appear, however, that, within a comparatively short time after the receipt of the moneys belonging to this estate, the guardian applied the same in liquidation of his own indebtedness and for his own individual benefit. Ho annual report appears to have been filed by the guardian, pursuant to the requirements of section 2842 of the Code of Civil Procedure, prior to the year 1892. On the 9th day of January, 1893, he di'd file in the office of the surrogate a report of his proceedings as such guardian for the year 1892, in which he
In the account filed for judicial settlement the guardian presents charges against the son for an amount which, if allowed, will more than absorb the entire estate and to this portion of the account objections are made; so that the only question raised upon this contest is as to whether the guardian should be allowed the entire funds of the estate or any portion thereof on account of expenses incurred by him in maintaining said minor.
There is no question of the authority of the Surrogate’s Court to make such allowances, if the facts disclosed by the evidence justify the same. In the case of Hyland v. Baxter, 98 H. Y.
So, in this case, the question is not one of power or authority, .but one of ascertaining what should be done under all the circumstances in the case, in order to reach an equitable disposition of the matter as between the guardian and his. son.
As already stated, early in the administration of the estate, the guardian appropriated the entire funds of the estate, not'to meeting the expenses of the support and maintenance of the infant, but for his own individual benefit and convenience; and it is by no means apparent that, at the time of making and filing the annual accounts above referred to, the guardian entertained any intention to charge the infant with the expenses of his support and maintenance. The transaction has, to some extent, the appearance of an effort on the part of the guardian, at this late day, to establish a defense against the claim of his son, when, in fact no intention existed in the mind of the guardian to make such charge at the time of the making of any expenditures for the infant.
The infant has no other estate than that which has come into the hands of his guardian, as above stated. He is a young man who has recently become of age, of ordinary intelligence and apparently in fair state of health, and is undoubtedly able, and during several years last past has been able, to maintain himself, or at least to contribute toward the expense of his maintenance. After the death of his mother the infant was taken to the home of the grandmother, where he was cared for by her,
The obligation of maintaining a child rests primarily upon the parent, and this obligation includes that of education to an extent consistent with the station in Efe of the parties. Such was the obligation resting upon the petitioner at the time he received the moneys in question; and it becomes incumbent upon him to' show affirmatively such a condition that the court, in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, can say, or should say, that the petitioner was unable to meet such obligation.
I am not satisfied from the evidence in the case that the guardian should be permitted to absorb this entire sum for his own benefit, notwithstanding the fact that he has incurred certain expenses in the maintenance and education of the minor; nor am I prepared to sáy, in view of the comparative situation of both the petitioner and Ms son, that the petitioner should now be required to account for the entire sum. I am of the opinion that, under all the circumstances, some allowance should be made from the principal of this estate to the petitioner on account of such care and maintenance.
A decree to that effect will be entered.
Decreed accordingly.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.