In re Arnold
Opinion of the Court
In a proceeding brought in May, 1961, the executor seeks to reopen the final decree settling the account of proceedings of Ruth Arnold Schlude (now Coffey) as administratrix etc., of Richard H. Arnold, deceased and to fix the amount due the Zeigler estate. This is based upon the claim that the court failed to obtain jurisdiction in that proceeding over the Zeigler estate and entered an incomplete decree insofar as that estate was concerned.
Neither the petition for settlement nor the citation issued in that proceeding complied with applicable provisions of the Surrogate’s Court Act. The petition complied with neither the mandatory nor the discretionary provisions of section 51 of the Surrogate’s Court Act with respect to setting forth the names of all persons interested in that proceeding and facts concerning interested infants. Two of the legatees of the Zeigler estate were infants. 'Similarly, the citation was defective in that it failed to cite any of the distributees of Maria Zeigler in accord
In the light of these facts, the decree of July 30,1943, to which the .surety was a party, must be set aside as to the Zeigler estate. (Fisher v. Banta, 66 N. Y. 468.) It was also incomplete with respect to the Zeigler estate in that it failed to establish the amount due the Zeigler estate. The right of the court to reopen the decree under these circumstances is clear. (Matter of Jagnow, 148 Misc. 657.)
The surety in its answer to the petition has alleged, among other things, that the issue is moot inasmuch as Bichard Arnold died insolvent; that the Statute of Limitations and laches of the executor are a bar; and that Charles W. H. Arnold, the original administrator of his father’s estate, and his surety are necessary parties to this proceeding.
The proceeding is not moot because Bichard Arnold’s defaults with respect to the estate of Maria Zeigler were bonded. The Statute of Limitations and laches are not a bar to a proceeding to reopen a void decree. (Kamp v. Kamp, 59 N. Y. 212; Langer v. Weihl, 207 Misc. 826.) And in any event, the surety’s answer does not allege, and there is no proof of, any detriment to the surety as a result of the delay. The statutory limitations in sections 521 and 528 of the Civil Practice Act with respect to reopening defective decrees are not applicable here. Charles W. H. Arnold is not a necessary party because he was suspended as administrator for military service pursuant to section 103-a of the Surrogate’s Court Act and never reinstated. His surety was properly relieved of the obligation on its bond and is not a necessary party here.
The petition will therefore be granted and the decree of July 30,1943 will be set aside to the extent that the decree and Schedule D of the account on which it is based be deemed modified to include the following provision: “And it is further ordered,
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.