In re the Estate of Myles
Opinion of the Court
OPINION OF THE COURT
Petitioners, the remaindermen of a trust which had been a part of one of respondent’s common trust funds, seek to have this court fix the date of valuation for the purposes of withdrawal of those funds from the common trust fund. Respondent cross-moves for summary judgment dismissing the petition.
Pursuant to the terms of decedent’s will and codicil, one
Petitioners request that this court fix the date for withdrawal from the common trust fund as September 29, 1978. Respondent, however, contends that the earliest date upon which a withdrawal could be made would have been October 31, 1978, and so, a withdrawal on November 30, 1978 benefited petitioners. Respondent admits that if the value of petitioners’ interest had been lower in November than in October, it would have been liable.
Investment and withdrawal of funds in a common trust is controlled by subdivision 6 of section 100-c of the Banking Law, which provides as follows: "No money of any estate, trust or fund shall be invested in nor funds be withdrawn from a common trust fund except as of a date on or as of which the value of such fund and all investments therein shall be determined * * * No withdrawal of funds shall be made from such common trust fund unless at least ñve days prior to the date of withdrawal notice of intention to make such withdrawal shall have been given to the trust company by a person entitled to require such withdrawal or, in lieu of such notice, the determination to make such withdrawal shall have been noted in the records of such trust company. The court having jurisdiction of an account of a trust company maintaining such common trust fund may by order at any time and whether or not an accounting proceeding is pending fix the date of valuation for the purpose of withdrawal of any share or interest in such common trust fund.” (Emphasis added.) Petitioners seek to avoid the apparent effect of this subdivision on a practicality theory based upon: (1) the provisions of subdivision 8 of section 100-c of the Banking Law: "On or as of the last business days of January, April, July and
"22.43 Valuation schedule, (a) Within 15 bank business days, or such other reasonable period as may be prescribed by the plan of operation, after any valuation date, the trust investment committee shall cause to be prepared a schedule of investments as of the valuation date which shall contain:
"(1) a description of each security issue or investment;
"(2) its face value;
"(3) its value as carried on the books of the common trust fund and
"(4) its value as determined as of such valuation date.”
* * *
"22.52 Periodic statement, (a) Within 20 bank business days after any valuation date, or within such other reasonable period as may be prescribed by the plan of operation the trust investment committee shall cause to be prepared, as of such valuation date, a statement of condition of the common trust fund on the basis of such valuation, showing separately the items of principal and income, and containing a memorandum of the following:
"(1) the number of units outstanding;
"(2) the value per unit and
"(3) the income per unit since the preceding valuation date.” (Emphasis added.) (Respondent valued the fund in question as of the last business day of each month.)
Petitioners’ position is a novel one and clearly one of first
State banks as well as national banks are prohibited from exercising any powers not expressly granted to them (O’Connor v Bankers Trust Co., 159 Misc 920, 932-933, affd 253 App Div 714, affd 278 NY 649, citing California Bank v Kennedy, 167 US 362, Nassau Bank v Jones, 95 NY 115; Investment Co. Inst. v Camp, 274 F Supp 624, 641, revd sub nom. National Assn. of Securities Dealers v Securities & Exch. Comm., 420 F2d 83, revd 401 US 617). In addition, "courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute.” (Investment Co. Inst. v Camp, 401 US 617, 626-627, supra.)
A reading of the statute in question, subdivision 6 of section 100-c of the Banking Law, alone supports the respondent that notice for withdrawal of funds from a common trust fund must be given to a bank at least five days before the valuation date. In this instance notice would have had to be given to respondent on or before September 24, 1978 if the September 29 valuation date is to be the one applied. Moreover, 3 NYCRR 22.50 (a) so provides: "No participation shall be admitted to or withdrawn from a common trust fund unless a written request for or notice of intention of taking such action shall have been entered in the records of the trust company and approved by the trust investment committee, at least five bank business days prior to the valuation date.” (See Atnally, Common Trust Funds — A Survey, 44 NY St B J 229, 233.)
Since the statute and regulations are clear, the respondent is prohibited from permitting a withdrawal as of September 29, 1978. Similarly, it would be improper for this court to order such a withdrawal. The only exception thereto would be if the provision were unconstitutional.
This court has been unable to find any case exactly on point; however, there is an analogous case which has been decided by the United States Supreme Court (Veix v Sixth Ward Assn., 310 US 32). That case involved New Jersey law and the purchase and sale of shares in a building and loan association. State statutes restricted the withdrawals with regard to the time for notice of withdrawals and to the manner of payment. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff-appellant had purchased the shares at the time that some of the statutory regulations were in effect and that he was bound by all of the statutory provisions in effect at the time he sought to redeem his shares and served his notice of withdrawal as a safeguard to vital economic interests. As a result that court upheld the statutes in question as constitutional in order to effectuate the public policy of protecting financial institutions which are "of major importance to the credit system of the State.” (Veix, supra, p 37.)
Upon similar grounds, this court finds that petitioners are bound by the above withdrawal limitations. These individuals were required to be notified of the intent to deposit the trust assets in the common trust fund, and so they are bound by the statutory provisions in toto.
For the foregoing reasons, the application is denied and the cross motion is granted.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.