*152 OPINION OP COURT.

The following is taken, verbatim, from the opinion.

The solution of the problem presented by this case, depends upon whether the one-half of tract A, which was admittedly ancestral property, was changed to non-ancestral property by the quit-claim deed which the plaintiffs gave to Park Williams, and which, on its face, purports to be’given for “divers good causes and considerations” and especially for .a consideration of $5000; and that solution depends in turn upon whether or not the aforementioned evidence was competent to show that said deed was not a deed of purchase but that the transaction of which said deed was a part, was an amicable partition of an estate theretofore held in common by the parties to said transaction, and for which there was no consideration other than the mutual release of the parties to such transaction.

The law applicable to this situation is stated by the Supreme Court as follows:

“3. When partition is made by mutual releases, they should be read and construed together, in the light of the circumsatnces attending their execution; and it is competent to show that their only purpose was to accomplish the partition, and no other consideration passed between the parties, though a pecuniary consideration be expressed in the deeds.” Carter et v. Day et, 58 OS. 96.

As we read the cases, the principle announced in the foregoing cases, is approved in Groves v. Groves, 65 OS. 442; Shehy v. Cunningham, 81 OS 289 and Huseman v. Fingermeyer, 106 OS. 113.

We consider the rule to be settled that while, for some purposes, a consideration named in a deed may be open to explanation by parol proof, such evidence is, as a general rule, incompetent where its effect is to vary the operative words of the deed.

But we consider it to be just as well established in Ohio that even if deeds between tenants in common, conveying ancestral property, purport to be made upon a money consideration, it may be shown by parol evidence that the transaction was in fact an amicable partition, that no money consideration passed, and that there was no consideration other than the mutual releases .to the parties.

We are of the opinion that the evidence in the case at bar, showing that in the transaction in question there was no consideration other than the mutual releases of the parties, was competent, and that the fact that the description -of the premises in the -deed of tract B included the undivided half of 71 acres formerly owned by Guy Williams, is not important; . .the circumstances clearly indicate the reason therefor, and in no sense did it constitute a consideration in the transaction.

We find that the evidence, together with all the circumstances, establishes the fact to our satisfaction that the transaction by which Park Williams acquired a one-half interest of tract A was not a bargain and sale, but was an amicable partition, by which the title which he acquired by descent from an ancestor, was not changed, and that his title in the one-half of tract A remained the same as that by which his undivided interest in the land was held.

It follows that the decree should be the same as in the court below, in favor of the plaintiffs.