There is no evidence in the record that the speed of the ear in rounding the curve from Adams to Superior Street was more than five or six miles an hour, but even that speed, under the facts and circumstances in evidence, might have been found by the jury to have been a failure to exercise ordinary care, and it may be that the jury found that the circumstances were such as to have required the motorman, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have stopped the car and have waited until plaintiff had crossed the track upon which it was being operated. Neither the operators of street cars nor of automobiles, in turning from one street to another, have any preferential right over pedestrians who, in conformity to a proper signal authorizing and directing them so to do, are crossing the street, and have not the right, under any and all circumstances, to proceed around the corner from one street to another without stopping, anticipating and expecting that pedestrians will run or jump backwards or forwards, as the case may be, to avoid injury. Ordinary care may require that the street car or automobile be stopped and wait for the pedestrian or that the pedestrian stop and wait for the street car or other vehicle to pass. What either should do in the exercise of ordinary care depends entirely upon the facts and circumstances of the particular tase. In the instant case there is evidence that the plaintiff was across the track and was Ait by the fender of the car as it swung around the curve onto Superior Street, and if the jury believed this testimony, then it might very well have found that the motorman did not exercise the care which the law imposes and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff. The law of Ohio provides that:

“Pedestrians shall not step into or upon a public road or highway without looking in both directions to see what is approaching.”

Assuming that this statutory provision applies to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, or that the exercise of ordinary care would so require, plaintiff testified that she did so look before proceeding to cross Superior Street, that the street car was “standing still” and that the way was clear. Having done this, as the jury may have found she did, and the traffic signal permitting her lawfully to proceed, in our judgment she was not required at every step to be looking in every direction to see whether or not she was in danger. It was for the jury to say whether or not the defendant was negligent and whether or not, if negligent, such negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, and also it was for the jury to say whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of negligence proximately contributing to her injuries. We have no hesitancy in concluding that the court did not err in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant and that the verdict and judgment are not manifestly against the weight of the evidence.

Finding no errors in the record prejudicial to the plaintiff in error, the judgment is affirmed.