OPINION OP COURT.

The following is taken, verbatim, from the opinion.

The question here is, whether or not the Municipal Court had jurisdiction to grant the equitable relief sought by the cross-bill of particulars.

It is argued by counsel for the plaintiff in error that such authority is to be found in 1558-9 GC., the pertinent part of which is as follows:

*227 “In the actions and proceedings of which the Municipal Court has jurisdiction, all laws conferring jurisdictions upon a court of Common Pleas, giving such court power to hear and determine such causes, prescribing the force and effect of their judgments, orders or decrees, shall be held to extend to the Municipal Court, unless inconsistent with this act or plainly inapplicable.”

We do not construe Section 1558-9 to give general equitable power to the Municipal Court. The cross-bill brings before the court the question of the exercise of general equitable power. The relifef is not based on any rights growing out of the merits of the case or liability on the account. It seeks to defeat the prosecution of the action. It may well be doubted that the cross-bill could be injected into the case had the court general equitable power.

Section 1558-9 GC. gives the Municipal Court equitable jurisdiction, when necessary, in order to carry out its judgments and orders and such matters as affect the rights of the parties on the merits of the case pending.

It is suggested in the brief that the section in question does not expressly exclude the granting of an injunction by the Municipal Court in this ease. But this is not the rule. The power must be expressly granted, and, not having been so granted, the Municipal Court was correct in sustaining the demurrer to the cross-bill of particulars.

The judgments of the Court of Common Pleas and Municipal Court will be affirmed.