It is clear that if Mrs. Gould had died prior to her mother, the deed which she executed in 1906, would not have conveyed any interest in this property.

The petition seeks to have the deed reformed, on the ground that there was a mutual mistake.

Mrs. Gould will be presumed to have known at the time of the conveyance that she might have a one-fourth interest in the real estate. She will also be presumed to have known that, figuring on the uncertainty of life, she might have more than a one-fourth interest, or she might predecease the life tenant, and, ther-fore, receive no interest whatever.

The language “take under the will, or by inheritance,” means all the interest that the grantor would receive except by purchase.

We are of opinion that at the time of the making of the deed, Mrs. Gould did not have any interest in the property that she could convey. But for a consideration that was satisfactory and that was solicited by her and her husband, she undertook to convey the interest that she would have at the death of her mother. It seems to us that a person so situated who conveys premises as if in fee simple, *615 by deed of general warranty, should be estop-ped to claim title to the premises against the grantee, his heirs, or assigns. Pollock v. Speidel, 27 Ohio St. 86. Shields v. Larkin, 21 Ohio St. 660.

The law is stated by textwriters as follows: That, with some exceptions which we • will not go into here, where a grantor has no title or a defective title, or an estate less than that which he assumes to convey with warranty, and subsequently acquires the estate which he has purported to convey and where he af-terwards perfects his title, such after-acquired or perfected title- will inure to the grantee or to his benefit by way of estoppel.

On the question of the reformation of the deed, the law is, that a court of equity will not reform a deed, unless it is established by clear and convincing evidence that there was a mutual mistake. Potter v. Potter, 27 Ohio St. 84.

The deed was drawn by Mrs. Gould’s attorney. Its language will, therefore, be construed to be her language, and it should be construed more strongly against her than against the grantee.

We hold, therefore, that the equities are in favor of the defendant, Mulligan, and that he is entitled on distribution to one-third of the proceeds in question.