The question then for consideration and determination is whether the $12,000 so deposited with the trust department of The Security-Home Trust Company should be allowed by the defendant as a preferred claim. If so, the motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted; otherwise, overruled.

The facts show that the funds deposited remained on deposit in the bank for a period much longer than sixty days before defendant assumed charge thereof for liquidation, and that having so continued on deposit the trust company, by the very terms of the stipulation under which the deposit was made, was expressly given the right to use it as any other moneys generally deposited in the bank might be used and for the privilege thus expressly given the moneys so on deposit bore “interest at the rate of 47o per annum, payable semiannually.” As said in McDonald, Admr. v Fulton, 125 Oh St, 507:

“It is to be observed that deposit in an interest-bearing account is directed, which of course contemplates use of the fund by the bank.”

This statement of the Supreme Court relates to a statutory direction, but it is none-the-less applicable to a contractual direction whereby the parties themselves determine the character of the deposit and convert what otherwise would have been a trust relation into that of debtor and creditor.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the motion of plaintiff for judgment on the pleadings should be and is overruled.