OPINION

In deciding the question thus presented, we shall.consider only the third ground of the. demurrer- It-is contended that Martin, *24 a witness, while under oath, in saying of Floraday, “you cannot tell the truth” committed perjury, an indictable offense involving moral turpitude, and that those words so spoken of Floraday necessarily injured him in his trade or occupation and are slanderous per se. There is nothing in the petition to indicate that the alleged slanderous words were spoken in relation to any material fact in issue in the action wherein Martin was a witness, nor is there any allegation in the petition as to Flora-day having any business or being engaged in any trade or occupation except as a shareholder in Fioraday-Eckel, Inc.,'- an Ohio corporation. It can hardly be claimed that being a shareholder or stockholder in an Ohio corporation- constitutes an individual trade or occupation, and if the statement accredited to Martin was material and relevant or, if construing the petition liberally it will be presumed to have been so, it was privileged. Taplin-Rice Co. v Hower, 124 Oh St, 123.

We conclude that the words spoken of Floraday under the facts and circumstances alleged in his petition are not actionable per se and did not cause any loss to him by way of special damages.

The judgment of the Court of' Common Pleas is therefore affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.