State Ex Rel. Bray v. Russell, Unpublished Decision (11-9-1998)
State Ex Rel. Bray v. Russell, Unpublished Decision (11-9-1998)
Opinion of the Court
Petitioner, Gary Bray, has brought an original action in habeas corpus in this court. Petitioner challenges his confinement under Ohio's new "bad time" provisions which were enacted as part of S.B. 2, effective July 1, 1996. Petitioner contends that his confinement for a bad time violation after the expiration of his stated sentence violates various constitutional provisions, particularly his right to due process of law, equal protection, and the doctrine of separation of powers.
Petitioner pled no contest and was found guilty of drug possession in violation of R.C.
(A) `violation' means an act that is a criminal offense under the law of this state or the United States, whether or not a person is prosecuted for the commission of the offense.
(B) As part of a prisoner's sentence, the parole board may punish a violation committed by the prisoner by extending the prisoner's stated prison term for a period of thirty, sixty, or ninety days in accordance with this section. The parole board may not extend a prisoner's stated prison term for a period longer than one-half of the state prison term's duration for all violations occurring during the course of the prisoner's stated prison term * * *. If a prisoner's stated prison term is extended under this section, the time by which it is so extended shall be referred to as "bad time." (Emphasis added.)
According to pertinent legislative history of S.B. 2, Ohio eliminated "virtually automatic" good time as inconsistent with the philosophy of "honest sentencing." A Plan for Felony Sentencing in Ohio: A Formal Report of the Ohio Criminal Sentencing Commission (July 1, 1993) (hereinafter "Plan for Felony Sentencing"). Bad time was designed as an alternative disciplinary tool, to provide the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction with a range of sanctions. Id. As emphasized above, the legislature provided that any bad time imposed is to be considered part of the prisoner's original sentence. All prisoners subject to bad time are informed that their stated sentence is subject to such extensions. R.C.
[I]f the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a prison term is necessary or required, the court shall do all of the following:
(a) impose a stated prison term;
(b) notify the offender that the parole board may extend the stated prison term if the offender commits any criminal offense under the laws of this state or the United States while serving the prison term, that the extension will be done administratively as part of the offender's sentence in accordance with section
2967.11 of the Revised Code and may be for thirty, sixty, or ninety days for each violation, that all extensions of any stated prison term for all violations during the course of the term may not exceed one-half of the term's duration, and that the sentence so imposed automatically includes any extension of the stated prison term by the parole board (emphasis added).
Although petitioner's sentencing is not part of this record, we may presume that he was informed by the trial court that his sentence was subject to the bad time provisions. State ex rel. Tillimon v. Weiher (1992),
Sections (C), (D), and (E) of R.C.
The warden then reviews the board's findings and recommendations. R.C.
If the parole board determines that there is clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner committed the violation and that the prisoner's stated prison term should be extended, the board shall consider the nature of the violation, other conduct of the prisoner while in prison, and any other evidence relevant to maintaining order in the institution. After considering these factors, the board shall extend the stated prison term by either fifteen, thirty, sixty, or ninety days for the violation.1
R.C.
Petitioner has challenged the bad time provisions on their face, not as they were applied to him. However, we briefly recite the procedural facts of his case. On December 29, 1997, a hearing of the Bad Time Panel of the Rules Infraction Board at Lebanon Correctional Institution was held. The panel found that petitioner had committed a Class II violation associated with R.C.
Petitioner's Exhibit C is the "Determination of Bad Time by the Ohio Parole Board," dated January 30, 1998, imposing 90 days bad time. It states in part:
Following review of the findings and report of the warden * * * the Ohio Parole Board has determined that there is clear and convincing evidence that the inmate committed a rule violation for which Bad Time may be imposed. In making this determination, the Parole Board considered:
use of weapon, extent of physical injury, extent of threat to security or orderly operation of institution, extent of threat to safety of any individual, extent to which the violation reflected organized criminal activity, extent of property damage caused by the inmate, other relevant factors.2
Petitioner asserts that his confinement due to the bad time determination outlined above is unconstitutional. He maintains that he should have been guaranteed the full panoply of rights attendant on any criminal proceeding, including, but not limited to, the right to a public jury trial, right to the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, right to counsel, and rights of confrontation and cross-examination. He argues that without these guarantees his right to the due process of law was violated. Petitioner also alleges that R.C.
The state responds that prison regulations are entitled to review under a deferential rational basis standard. The state asserts that the legislature had a rational basis for enacting bad time, i.e., to preserve discipline in the prisons. Therefore, the state maintains that the bad time provisions are constitutional.
Before turning to the merits of petitioner's claims, we note that the state has moved to dismiss this habeas corpus petition. The state contends that because petitioner has been released, his claim is now moot. We agree that as to petitioner, this case is moot. However, although a case may be moot, a court may decide the issues raised where they are capable of repetition, yet evading review. State ex rel. Fenley v. Kyger (1995),
We begin our analysis with the principle that all legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. State v. Thompkins (1996),
In statutes affecting criminal sentences the presumption of constitutionality has even more force:
Pursuant to its police powers, the General Assembly has the authority to enact laws defining criminal conduct and to prescribe its punishment * * * [L]aws passed by virtue of the police power will be upheld if they bear a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained, namely the health, safety, or general welfare of the public, and are not arbitrary, discriminatory, capricious or unreasonable. The federal test is similar. To determine whether such statutes are constitutional under federal scrutiny, we must decide if there is a rational relationship between the statute and its purpose.
Id. (citations omitted.) With these standards in mind we address petitioner's various constitutional claims.
We will assume, arguendo, that a prisoner's interest in release at the end of his stated prison term is a type of liberty interest. However, that liberty interest was, as part of his sentence, expressly made subject to conditional bad time. A sentence which is partially determinate and partially indeterminate is not on that basis unconstitutional. In reviewing state sentencing practices, the United States Supreme Court has held that, subject only to highly deferential proportionality analysis, "reviewing courts should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes." Solem v. Helm (1983),
We have reviewed the Supreme Court's examination of conditional liberty interests in a variety of contexts. In the prison context particularly, the Court has been careful to examine both the asserted liberty interest of the prisoner and the institutional needs of the prison authorities. For instance, in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex (1979),
In contrast, in Morrissey v. Brewer (1972),
An intermediate level of procedural protections has been provided by the Court for revocation of good time credits. In Wolff v. McDonnell (1974),
We conclude that petitioner's interest in release at the end of his stated sentence without "bad time" is substantially equivalent to the prisoners' interest in sentences shortened with "good time" as analyzed in Wolff. We reach this conclusion by examining how good time operates in practice, both in Ohio and in the state schemes which the Supreme Court has reviewed.
Under Ohio's previous sentencing scheme, sentences were determinate or indeterminate. Generally, for felonies other than aggravated murder or murder, offenders were imprisoned for an indefinite term of imprisonment. Each degree of felony carried an indeterminate penitentiary or reformatory sentence consisting of a minimum term fixed by the trial court from among four choices provided by statute, and a maximum term fixed by the statute, and otherwise subject to the parole board's discretion. Plan for Felony Sentencing at 9.
This sentencing scheme operated to place a good deal of discretion in the hands of the parole authorities. Some discretion over the actual length of a prisoner's confinement was also placed in the hands of the prison authorities due to their ability to impose reductions in "good time." Good time was codified at R.C.
This court has previously explained just how the "good time" system impacted the length of sentences.
When inmates are admitted to the Ohio corrections system, an end-of-sentence date is calculated taking into account good time that can be earned during the course of confinement. R.C.
2967.19 (E) permits prospective deductions of good time, but does not allow deduction of good time previously earned. Accordingly, the only available method to penalize inmates with loss of good time is to deduct good time previously credited that would otherwise have been earned in the future by adding days to the end-of-sentence date previously determined. (Emphasis added).
State ex rel. Lewis v. Madison Correctional Institution (July 10, 1995), Madison App. No 94-11-043, unreported. In Lewis, for example, the penalty for a rules infraction was "12 months good time due to nature of charge," meaning that the petitioner was rendered unable to earn good time for twelve months. The penalty was imposed by "adding one hundred fifty-six days `lost good time' to his sentence." Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has consistently evaluated good time (or "gain time") provisions with the realistic acknowledgment that good time often affects not merely the discretionary date of parole eligibility but the actual date on which a prisoner must otherwise be released. For instance, in McGinnis v. Royster (1972),
The Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged that good time has a significant impact on sentences. In a recent ruling on enactments which affect sentences, the Court held that a legislature cannot change its provisions affecting good time or gain time or even overcrowding time without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Lynce v. Mathis (1997), U.S.,
As noted above, in specifically determining what due process protections attach to a loss of good time decision, the Supreme Court first held that there was a substantial liberty interest involved and then balanced that interest against the prison's need for discipline. In Wolff, Nebraska prisoners challenged prison officials' decision to revoke good time credits as a disciplinary measure.
Wolff held that:
Where a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of good time credits * * * the inmate must receive (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.
Id. (citing
In Hill, the Court added one further requirement, that the finding of the prison disciplinary board be supported by "some evidence in the record."
We find that the Wolff/Hill protections are applicable to the imposition of bad time. We hold that imposition of bad time requires protections equivalent to those applicable to the loss of good time for two important reasons: First, both the loss of good time and the imposition of bad time extend the period of imprisonment. Second, for either sanction, the decision and whatever procedures are required must take place inside the institutional setting.
Having determined that the protections constitutionally attendant on the reduction of good time are appropriate, our remaining task is to determine whether the bad time provisions meet those guidelines. We conclude that they do.
Wolff's first requirement is advance written notice of the disciplinary charges.
No inmate shall appear before the rules infraction board sooner than twenty-four hours following the receipt by the inmate of the written conduct report as approved by the administrative review officer, unless the inmate, by a free and voluntary waiver, desires a hearing in a shorter period of time,
Therefore, Wolff's first requirement of advance written notice of the charges is met.
Wolff's second requirement is the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence.
(D) The inmate may, at the discretion of the chairman of the rules infraction board, call a reasonable number of witnesses, including inmates, to testify and to present documentary evidence. The request shall not be unreasonably denied.
We find that Wolff's second requirement is satisfied by these regulations.
Wolff's final requirement is a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.
The panel shall advise the inmate of their determination and the procedure for appeal and review of their decision. The panel shall make written findings briefly stating the evidence relied upon and the basis for any disposition made by them, including a recommendation for bad time.
Thus, Wolff's final requirement is also met.
In Hill, the Supreme Court added the requirement that the decision of the prison disciplinary board be supported by "some evidence."
ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied would not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.
The bad time regulations provide that the panel of the rules infraction board is to make several determinations, including whether there is at least some evidence that the accused inmate has committed a rule violation; whether there is at least some evidence that the accused inmate has committed a bad time violation; and whether the evidence of a bad time violation amounts to clear and convincing evidence. Ohio Adm. Code 5120-9-091(C)(3)(a), (b), and (c). Additionally, no inmate shall be found to have violated a rule unless the finding is based on some evidence which may include circumstantial evidence, considering the record as a whole. Ohio Adm. Code
We find that these regulations sufficiently require that the decision to impose bad time be supported by at least some evidence as mandated by Hill. Therefore, the final due process requirement has been met. We hold that bad time is constitutional under the appropriate due process analysis.
All prisoners are treated equally under the bad time provisions, therefore the only classification is between prisoners who have been convicted and sentenced for a crime and those who commit an offense while not under a sentence. See, e.g., State v. Thompkins (1996),
Similarly, there is no equal protection violation where a parole revocation results in more imprisonment than the same offense would have earned if tried on a separate criminal charge. See United States ex rel. Viotratos v. Campbell (N.D.Ohio 1976),
Furthermore, in Turner v. Saffley (1978),
Under rational basis scrutiny, legislative distinctions are invalid only if they bear no relation to the state's goals and no ground can be conceived to justify them. Thompkins,
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the administration of justice by the judicial branch of the government cannot be impeded by the other branches of the government in the exercise of their respective powers. State v. Hochhausler (1996),
In the only other opinion on the merits of bad time, Judge O'Neill in dissent has argued that bad time's "in-house court system" violates the doctrine of separation of powers. State v. Spikes (Sept. 8, 1998), Lake Co. App. No. 97-L-158, unreported, (O'Neill, J., dissenting).4 Judge O'Neill maintains that bad time is at odds with Article IV, Section I of the Ohio Constitution which provides:
The judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas, and division thereof, and such other courts inferior to the supreme court as may from time to time be established by law.
However, this provision has not been violated where, as here, no judicial power has been usurped. Administrative hearing officers are empowered to decide a broad variety of issues. In Morrissey, for instance, the Supreme Court specifically held that for revocation of parole, although there must be both a preliminary and a final hearing, neither hearing must be before a judicial officer. All that is constitutionally required is a "`neutral and detached hearing body' such as a traditional parole board."
Petition denied.
YOUNG, P.J., and POWELL, J., concur.
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