Instrumentation Tec. v. Beacon Insurance, Unpublished Decision (4-14-2000)
Instrumentation Tec. v. Beacon Insurance, Unpublished Decision (4-14-2000)
Opinion of the Court
In the summer of 1987, ITI, acting through insurance agent Richard Tramte ("Tramte"), contacted Beacon to inquire about purchasing a commercial general liability ("GCL") insurance policy. After reviewing ITI's business practices, Beacon informed Tramte that it would not provide ITI with a quote for insurance because it did not meet its underwriting requirements due to its diverse work environment. Tramte called Beacon for more information and learned that the reason Beacon would not provide a quote was because it did not want to underwrite the products liability/completed operations risks associated with ITI's business.
Tramte contacted Donald Hobbins, an officer of ITI, with this information and explained that Beacon would not provide a quote unless ITI was willing to accept a policy without the products liability/completed operations coverage. Hobbins advised Tramte that he did not believe ITI needed either coverage. As a result, Tramte asked Beacon to provide ITI with a quote excluding products liability/completed operations coverage. Beacon complied and subsequently issued its standard GCL policy with an additional endorsement excluding the above coverage.1
On January 11, 1995, Stephen Barber ("Barber") was severely injured while working on a machine apparently designed, built, or serviced by ITI. As a result of his injuries, Barber sued several companies, including ITI. ITI promptly notified Beacon and sought coverage under its GCL policy. However, Beacon denied coverage, citing the endorsement to the policy which excluded coverage for bodily injury or property damage occurring away from premises owned or rented by ITI and arising out of ITI's products or completed work. On February 27, 1998, ITI settled its case with Barber for $15,000.
On June 17, 1998, ITI filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Beacon and Kann Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Kann"), Beacon's agent, setting out nine separate causes of action. In its answer, Beacon admitted the factual allegations in the complaint, but denied that, as a matter of law, appellant was entitled to coverage under its policy.
Beacon filed a motion for summary judgment on October 5, 1998 arguing that: (1) the policy as written eliminated coverage for products liability/completed operations; (2) ITI had accepted the policy as written; and (3) ITI lacked standing to pursue a cause of action based on a violation of R.C.
After considering the parties' arguments, the trial court concluded that the endorsement in question had been filed with the Department of Insurance on March 17, 1986, in accordance with R.C.
ITI filed a timely notice of appeal to the trial court's grant of summary judgment. However, after an initial review of the notice of appeal and its attachments, this court ordered ITI to submit a memorandum in support of jurisdiction as a result of our concern that the voluntary dismissal of the remaining claims against Kann may have been ineffective. ITI complied with our request, and, based on the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision inDenham v. New Carlisle (1999),
"The Trial Court erred in granting the Defendant Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment and in failing to grant the Plaintiff Insured's Motion for Summary Judgment."
In support of this assignment, ITI argues that a specific filing with the Ohio Department of Insurance to provide products liability/completed operations coverage controls over any exclusion to the contrary. ITI believes that Beacon was obligated by its own policy to automatically provide the coverage in question and that in the absence of proof that an insured voluntarily relinquished a known right, the insured may not agree to any policy that violates R.C.
Summary judgment is proper when: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come but to one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor. Civ.R. 56(C); Leibreich v. A.J. Refrigeration, Inc.
(1993),
Material facts are those facts which might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law of the case. Turner v. Turner
(1993),
Moreover, a party seeking summary judgment on the grounds that the nonmoving party cannot prove its case bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and of identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential elements of the nonmoving party's claims. Dresher v. Burt (1996),
If the moving party meets its initial burden under Civ.R. 56(C), then the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden to respond, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in the rule, in an effort to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of fact suitable for trial. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to do so, then the trial court may enter summary judgment against the party.Id.
Pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3937, any insurance company doing business in Ohio is required to adhere to what is commonly known as the "file and use" system. This simply means that a company's rates for general liability coverage must be "filed" with the Superintendent of Insurance and only then may such rates be "used," unless they are disapproved by the superintendent. In reInvestigation of National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1993),
Here, there is no dispute that the GCL policy issued to ITI which included the additional endorsement excluding products liability/completed operations coverage represented a change from Beacon's standard policy. Furthermore, Beacon readily admits that it did not file the policy change with the Department of Insurance as required by R.C.
Nevertheless, Beacon was listed at the Department of Insurance as a member of the Insurance Services Office ("ISO"). Filings made by ISO indicate that the standard GCL policy normally would have included coverage for products liability and completed operations. However, ISO had also filed several exclusionary endorsement forms, including the form at issue here, which was filed on March 17, 1986. As the trial court found, this endorsement was effective for all policies filed on or after April 1, 1986.
As a member of ISO, Beacon was entitled to use this particular endorsement without first filing a similar one on its own behalf. As R.C.
In addition, we believe ITI misinterprets the underlying purpose of R.C.
Finally, we would briefly like to address Beacon's argument that ITI lacked standing to pursue a private cause of action against Beacon based on alleged violations of R.C.
Based on the foregoing analysis, and after construing all of the evidence most strongly in ITI's favor, this court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether ITI was entitled to products liability/completed operations coverage.
Appellant's sole assignment of error is without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
_________________________ JUDGE JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY
FORD, P.J., NADER, J., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.