Since the trial court should have directed a verdict against the Dempses on the issue of liability, I agree with the majority's analysis and its resolution of the merits of this appeal. As a matter of law, the case should not have gone to the jury due to the lack of evidence of what caused Ms. Demps to slip and fall. I share, however, the concern noted by the majority over the lack of any African-Americans among the eighteen jurors summoned to the courtroom. Because of its importance to the integrity of the judicial system, I find this issue worthy of additional comment.

A jury need not "mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population." Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522, 538, 95 S.Ct. 692, 702. However, "selection of a petit jury from a cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial." Id. at 528, 95 S.Ct. at 697. Therefore, "the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof." Id. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 702. If selection of jurors is based on race, it is incumbent upon a reviewing court to correct the error without regard to prejudice. Rose v. Mitchell (1979),443 U.S. 545, 99 S.Ct. 2993, 3000.

Here, the trial court appropriately conducted an evidentiary hearing to inquire into the Demps's constitutional challenge to the array. The testimony of the jury commissioner established substantial compliance with the procedures of R.C. Chapter 2313 for the random selection of qualified jurors from the list of voters. There was no evidence presented during the hearing on the Demps's pretrial challenge to suggest that their right to random selection of the jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was violated by systematic exclusion of African-Americans.

Still, we should be acutely aware that, even absent evidence of deliberate exclusion, a jury array lacking in members of a particular race may understandably create a strong perception of unfairness. Indeed, the unfairness may not be all perception. Whether justified or not, this sense of unfairness tends to undermine the credibility of the judicial process for a large segment of our community. As noted recently in a report by the Ohio Commission on Racial Fairness, sponsored by the Supreme Court of Ohio and the Ohio State Bar Association, a high percentage of African-Americans shares a common perception of disparate treatment by the courts. And Judge Tyack has observed in his dissent in Phillips v. Value City Stores, Inc. (Sept. 16, 1997), Franklin App. No. 96APE12-1711, unreported, "We live in a time when it is particularly important that the court system not only be fair, but that it be seen as fair."

The difficulty, of course, is in the remedy. Absent a constitutional violation or an error involving a departure from the statutory procedures for jury selection, the system would be equally, if not more severely, compromised should trial and appellate courts attempt to fashion ad hoc solutions. Judicial tinkering with the composition of the jury in a particular case may only add to the perception of unfairness, exacerbating rather than correcting the problem. In my view, therefore, this issue would be more effectively addressed on a systemic rather than an individual level, and is thus more appropriately the job of the legislature or a judicial-administrative body.

The Dempses filed suit in 1998, alleging that the negligence of the defendants-appellees had caused Ms. Demps to slip and fall on the premises of the Museum Center. The cause proceeded to a jury trial in April 1999. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants-appellees, and the Dempses appealed.

Because we find Galbreath's cross-assignment of error dispositive of the appeal, we address it first.² Galbreath contends that the trial court erred in refusing to enter a directed verdict at the close of the Dempses' case-in-chief. We agree.

Pursuant to Civ. R. 50, the trial court must grant a motion for a directed verdict, when, construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, it concludes that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, which is adverse to the nonmoving party.³ In the instant case, the Dempses were unable to adduce any evidence that the negligence of the defendants-appellees was the proximate cause of their injuries. None of the Dempses' witnesses was able to identify the cause of Ms. Demps's fall. The witnesses were able to state only that workers were buffing the floor in the general vicinity of the fall. They could not state that the floor at the location of the fall had been buffed or that the defendants-appellees had otherwise caused the fall. Under these circumstances, reasonable minds could conclude only that the Dempses had failed to demonstrate liability.⁴ We therefore sustain Galbreath's cross-assignment of error and hold that the motion for a directed verdict should have been granted.

We now turn to the assignments of error raised in the Dempses' brief. In their second and third assignments of error, the Dempses contend that the jury's verdict was based upon insufficient evidence and was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Having found that the case was not properly submitted to the jury because a directed verdict should have been entered, we find the second and third assignments of error to be without merit.

In the first assignment of error, the Dempses argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new jury array. The Dempses, who are African-American, objected to the jury array, which contained no African-Americans. We find this assignment to be moot in light of our disposition of Galbreath's cross-assignment of error. We do note our concern that the jury array in the instant case consisted entirely of Caucasians and arguably did not represent a fair cross-section of the population.⁵ Nonetheless, as the Dempses failed to meet their burden of production in demonstrating liability, we need not address the propriety of the trial court's denial of the motion for a new array. The trial court's judgment is accordingly affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. DOAN, P.J., concurs.

GORMAN, J., concurs separately.

RAYMOND E. SHANNON, retired, of the First Appellate District, sitting by assignment.

¹ The record indicates that Galbreath is responsible for maintaining and cleaning the Museum Center premises.

² Although we would not be obligated to address this assignment of error unless we were to find plaintiffs-appellants' assignments of error to warrant reversal, we are not foreclosed from addressing it pursuant to R.C. 2505.22. See Hicks v. WestinghouseMaterials Co. (Sept. 27, 1995), Hamilton App. No. C-940094, unreported, affirmed (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 95, 676 N.E.2d 872.

³ Alley v. Wendy's International, Inc. (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 810,814, 669 N.E.2d 538, 540.

⁴ Id. at 815, 669 N.E.2d at 541.

⁵ It is well established that the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79,106 S.Ct. 1712, applies to civil, as well as criminal, cases. See Alley,supra; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. (1991), 500 U.S. 614,111 S.Ct. 2077.