I concur in the majority's disposition of appellant's sole assignment of error. I write separately only to clarify my reason for doing so. Appellant's right to a jury instruction on vehicular homicide was not barred merely because ". . . his defense centered on only one issue, who was the driver . . ." Majority Opinion at 4. Even though a defendant offers only a complete defense, such does not always mean no reasonable view of the evidence would support a lesser included offense. By way of illustration, a defendant charged with felonious assault might offer as his only defense the complete defense of alibi. However, the evidence at trial might arguably support the conclusion the victim suffered only physical harm as opposed to serious physical harm. In such a situation, despite the fact the defendant only presented the complete defense of alibi, the defendant would still be entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of assault. Likewise, in the case sub judice, the fact appellant only presented a complete defense, does not preclude analysis of whether a reasonable view of the evidence would support the jury's conclusion appellant's driving was negligent as opposed to reckless. Such analysis depends upon evidence other than appellant's complete defense. The details concerning how the accident happened together with appellant's actions leading up to the accident impact this issue. Upon review of that evidence, I conclude under no reasonable view of the evidence would a jury have found appellant's driving to have been less than reckless. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.

OPINION

I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF VEHICULAR HOMICIDE.

The persuasiveness of the evidence regarding the lesser included offense is irrelevant. If under any reasonable view of the evidence it is possible for the trier of fact to find the defendant not guilty of the greater offense and guilty of the lesser offense, the instruction on the lesser included offense must be given. The evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to defendant.

In pretrial motions, defense counsel was partially successful in attacking the weight to be given to the blood alcohol tests performed on appellant. See, Judgment Entry filed November 9, 1999. At trial, there was strenuous cross-examination to the blood alcohol test results and their meaning. T. at 469-474. The entire defense presented at opening statement and closing argument was that appellant was not the driver of the vehicle. T. at 79, 80, 82, 738, 743, 750, 756, 764. Defense counsel emphasized the dispute centered around who was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. T. at 738. Defense counsel argued appellant's admissions to being the driver made at the scene were made by an "out of control" and "inconsolable" individual. T. at 80. To this end, defense counsel elicited testimony of appellant's distraught nature at the scene. T. at 111, 114-115, 126, 140-141, 191, 256, 260-261, 567, 570. Further, defense counsel presented witnesses who challenged the medical records and the opinion of the Ohio State Highway Patrol accident reconstruction expert that appellant was the driver. T. at 586-588, 590-593, 596-599, 623-649, 683. Clearly the defense centered on only one issue, who was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident. After lengthy argument by counsel, the trial court found "it feels the lesser included offense is not appropriately given in this case." T. at 700. Given the defense presented, we concur with this decision. With the presentation of a complete defense only, there would have been no way to consider the lesser included offense under a reasonable view of the evidence. The sole assignment of error is denied. The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Ashland County, Ohio is hereby affirmed. By Farmer. and Edwards, J. concur. Hoffman concurs separately.