In his single assignment of error, appellant argues:

THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH R.C. 2950.03 WHEN THE JUDGE NEGLECTED TO TELL THE DEFENDANT THAT HE MUST NOT ONLY NOTIFY THE SHERIFF OF HIS INTENTION TO MOVE, BUT MUST DO SO IN WRITING (R.C. 2950.05(a)), MUST NOT ONLY NOTIFY OF HIS INTENTION TO MOVE, BUT MUST REGISTER WHEN HE MOVES (R.C. 2950.05(b)), AND MUST NOT ONLY VERIFY HIS ADDRESS "ONCE A YEAR," BUT MUST DO SO ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF HIS INITIAL REGISTRATION DATE, R.C. 2950.06(b)(2).

Appellant does not challenge his conviction or sentence. He claims only that the court incorrectly performed its administrative duty of notifying him of his registration obligations. Appeal is not an appropriate means to remedy the court's failure to perform this duty.

This court has jurisdiction:

Upon an appeal upon questions of law to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or final orders of courts inferior to the court of appeals within the district, including the finding, order, or judgment of a juvenile court that a child is delinquent, neglected, abused, or dependent, for prejudicial error committed by such lower court.

R.C. 2501.02; also see App.R. 12. Appellant does not ask this court to review the trial court's judgment for prejudicial error¹ or to affirm, modify, set aside or reverse the judgment. He only asks us to remand this matter for more specific notice of his registration duties. We lack jurisdiction on appeal to grant the relief appellant requests.²

This court has previously reversed the sentences imposed on criminal defendants and remanded for resentencing where the court failed to notify defendants who have been sentenced to a prison term of the potential for administratively imposed prison time and the potential sanctions for violation of post release control terms. See, e.g., State v. Davis (June 18, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 72820, unreported; State v. Hayley (Dec. 2, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 74718, unreported. In these cases, the state has agreed that the sentence should be reversed and remanded, so the appropriateness of this remedy was not discussed. The supreme court has recently clarified that post-release control is part of the offender's sentence, about which the offender must be advised at sentencing. Woodsv. Telb (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 504, paragraph two of the syllabus. By contrast, the registration duties of R.C. Chap. 2950 are not punitive but are remedial in nature and, therefore, are not part of the sentence. SeeState v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404. Mandamus may be available to compel a court to notify the offender of such post-sentence obligations, but it is not within our power on appellate review to order a notification that does not affect the validity of the conviction or sentence.

Appeal dismissed.

This cause is dismissed.

It is, therefore, considered that said appellee recover of said appellants his costs herein.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

JOHN T. PATTON, J. CONCURS

DIANE KARPINSKI, P.J. DISSENTS (See separate Opinion)

¹ Appellant would be hard-pressed to demonstrate prejudice from the trial court's failure to give him notice, in light of the prison officials' duty to notify appellant of his registration duties at least ten days before he is released, if and when he ever is released. R.C.2950.03(A)(1).

² Although appellant has not invoked this court's original jurisdiction, we note that mandamus may be the appropriate remedy to compel a court to discharge a judicial function or duty. The principles governing mandamus are well established: A relator must demonstrate that he or she has a clear legal right to the relief requested, that the respondent has a clear legal duty to provide the relief requested, and that there is no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 118. We express no opinion about appellant's ability to meet these requirements.

I respectfully dissent from the dismissal and would affirm the trial court's judgment. Regardless of whether the proper remedy in this case is appeal or mandamus, this court does not lack jurisdiction in this appeal. This court has jurisdiction under R.C. 2505.02.

Appealing from his criminal conviction and sentence, defendant argues that the trial court did not properly inform him at the time of sentencing of the reporting and registration requirements as a sexually oriented offender. R.C. Chapter 2950 establishes these requirements, and R.C. 2929.13(I) requires the court to inform the convict of these requirements and to incorporate a summary of them into its criminal sentencing entry.

Defendant's conviction and sentence constitute a final appealable order. R.C. 2505.02. Legal errors in sentencing are raised by direct appeal. Dismissal of an appeal for lack of jurisdiction would not be appropriate even if an alternate remedy were available. Mandamus, however, is not an alternative to direct appeal.

Mandamus is an extraordinary writ. It is not an appropriate remedy to challenge defects in criminal sentencing, e.g., State ex rel. Sampson v.Parrott (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 92, or proceedings. State ex rel. Billingsv. Friedland (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 237. Even if the registration requirements were considered to be totally separate (that is, civil and remedial), rather than part of the criminal (and punitive) sentencing, the remedy to challenge error in civil proceedings is direct appeal rather than mandamus. Mandamus does not lie when there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. E.g., State ex rel.Wittenderger v. Clarke (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 207 (challenging costs of dismissed sexual offender classification proceeding).

Acknowledging that an appeal in this case is proper, I would affirm on the merits. The trial court's journal entry summarizes the requirements as required by R.C. 2929.13(I). Defendant complains that the court did not inform defendant of two details: that his notice had to be made in writing and filed on the anniversary date.

It is obvious, however, that defendant knows the details omitted at the time of sentencing and suffered no prejudice. Although the court, along with the form it uses, could have been more specific, there is no point to remanding this case to inform defendant of what he already knows and what he will be reminded of by the prison authorities upon release from prison. No prejudice attaches, therefore, to this error.

Anticipating appeals which complain of errors in the trial court, Crim.R. 52 specifies how to treat the kind of harmless error that has occurred here: "Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." The rule does not remove jurisdiction simply because no remedy is available.

App.R. 12(B) advises what this court is to do when the error cited is harmless:

When the court of appeals determines that the trial court committed no error prejudicial to the appellant in any of the particulars assigned and argued in appellant's brief and that the appellee is entitled to have the judgment or final order of the trial court affirmed as a matter of law, the court of appeals shall enter judgment accordingly. [Emphasis added.]

I would, therefore, affirm the trial court.