Schubel v. Rinehart, Unpublished Decision (7-12-2000)
Schubel v. Rinehart, Unpublished Decision (7-12-2000)
Opinion of the Court
On September 8, 1997, Appellant filed a complaint in the Lorain County Common Pleas Court, seeking to recover the sum of $13,000 from Appellee. Appellant alleged that the funds were transferred to Appellee as a loan in 1991 and that she had not repaid the loan. After a bench trial, the trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and determined that, at the time the money was provided to Appellee, there was no intent that such would be a loan. Instead, the trial court held that, after being removed from the account, the money became a gift from Appellant to Appellee. The subsequent written correspondence, in which Appellee offered repayment, were deemed to be without consideration. Appellant timely appealed, asserting one assignment of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE MONIES TRANSFERRED TO [APPELLEE] WERE INTENDED TO BE A GIFT.
The essential elements of an inter vivos gift include: (1) intent of the donor to make an immediate gift; (2) delivery of the property to the donee; and (3) acceptance of the gift by the donee. Lauerman v. Destocki (1993),
87 Ohio App.3d 657 ,665 . "An inter vivos gift is an immediate, voluntary, gratuitous and irrevocable transfer of property by a competent donor to another." Smith v. Shafer (1993),89 Ohio App.3d 181 ,183 . At the trial court level, "[t]he burden of showing that an inter vivos gift was made is on the donee by clear and convincing evidence." Id., citing In re Estate of Fife (1956),164 Ohio St. 449 ,456 . On appeal, "where the proof required must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof." Lauerman,87 Ohio App.3d at 667 .1
Appellant has argued that evidence presented to the trial court was insufficient to support a finding that Appellee had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that the money was intended to be a gift. Specifically, he has claimed that Appellee's correspondence to him during 1992 and 1993 demonstrated that the two had an understanding that the money was a loan. Appellee's letter, dated July 10, 1992, referred to an "original plan" which involved repayment. Her letters, dated July 8 and 10, 1993, make reference to a "payback plan" and to an appointment with an attorney to establish such a scheme. Appellant has also pointed to Appellee's testimony in which she conceded that she recalled a writing wherein she had credited $100 against the $13,000.2 Indeed, Appellant has maintained that the record is void of any evidence that Appellee ever denied that the funds were truly a loan. Finally, Appellant has directed this Court's attention to his own testimony in which he stated that he never intended the money to be a gift.
In response, Appellee has pointed to Appellant's testimony in which he conceded that, at the time of the transfer: (1) there was nothing signed indicating that the transfer was a loan or that interest would be charged; (2) no repayment schedule was ever discussed; and (3) no minimum payment was ever discussed. Appellee has argued that, because no reference to the money was ever made until the relationship began to deteriorate, the intent at the time of the transfer was to convey a gift. Finally, she has argued that her testimony, in which she stated that her letters were written in an attempt to save the relationship and that Appellant had previously transferred real estate to her without restrictions, provided the trial court with sufficient evidence to reach its ultimate decision.
After reviewing the record, this Court agrees with Appellee and, therefore, concludes that the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to conclude that Appellant intended the money to be a gift to Appellee at the time of the transfer. This Court will not second guess a trial court's determination of the witnesses' veracity and the reliability of evidence. See SeasonsCoal Co. v. Cleveland (1984),
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E).
Costs taxed to Appellant.
Exceptions.
_____________________________ BETH WHITMORE
FOR THE COURT BATCHELDER, P.J.
BAIRD, CONCUR.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.