OPINION

The next day, a motion opposing the appearance of David L. Day as attorney for Elizabeth was filed by the Guardian Ad Litem. Attorney Day subsequently filed responses to both the request for clarification and the Guardian Ad Litem's motion. Attorney Day, on February 25, 2000, filed a motion requesting "an order appointing attorney, David L. Day, as counsel for said minor [Elizabeth Watkins] pursuant to his contract with Marry (sic) Harris or at the expense of Coshocton County for the reason that it appears from the record herein that nobody who has appeared before the court in this matter is in a position to properly and zealously represent the interests of said minor." The same day, Mrs. Elizabeth Watkins, the maternal grandmother, moved for the appointment of independent counsel for Elizabeth. A hearing was held on March 1, 2000, on whether Attorney Day would be permitted to continue as counsel for Elizabeth and/or whether separate and independent counsel would be appointed for the two minor children in this case. At the hearing, Attorney Day submitted a legal opinion letter dated February 24, 2000, addressed to him from Attorney Charles Kettlewell. Attorney Kettlewell, in his opinion letter, advised Day that since Elizabeth, as a minor, could not to consent to Mary Harris' hiring of Day to represent Elizabeth, "you should have the court provide the "applicable consent" in order for you to proceed with this representation." Pursuant to a Judgment Entry filed on March 3, 2000, the trial court denied Attorney Day's motion for approval or appointment as counsel for Elizabeth and appointed Susan Cultice Brown as attorney for Elizabeth. The trial court, in its entry, specifically stated, in part, as follows: 4. Mary Harris has entered into an agreement to pay the fees of Attorney Day to represent the child. 5. Attorney Day has vehemently argued that he has completely isolated himself from any communication or influence by or between Mary Harris and himself in an attempt to establish and maintain his independence in representing the minor child Elizabeth (Beth) Watkins. However, the fourth paragraph of his fee agreement letter, to Mary Harris, dated January 24, 2000, and admitted as Day's Exhibit #1 states in part ". . . We will keep you advised of pertinent activities and from time to time will request that you and any potential witnesses meet with me or my associates to discuss strategies, witnesses and trial preparation . . ." 6. Attorney Day has been silent as to the wishes of Beth, but throughout these proceedings the content and tenor of his pleadings on behalf of Beth espoused a position very closely aligned to that of John Yoho. 7. There is, at minimum, the appearance of a conflict of interest in Attorney Day's representation of Elizabeth (Beth) Watkins. 8. In order to avoid the appearance of impropriety Attorney Day should not be permitted to continue as counsel for Elizabeth (Beth) Watkins. 9. Therefore the Motion Opposing the Appointment of David Day as attorney for Beth Watkins is hereby GRANTED; the Motion of Approval or Appointment of David L. Day as attorney for Beth is hereby DENIED. This ruling also addresses the Request for Clarification of Representation filed by CCCSB. 10. The Court has, however, determined that it is in the best interest of both children that separate and independent counsel be appointed by the Court for them.

It is from the trial court's February 19, 1999, May 19, 1999, August 11, 1999, October 13, 1999, November 24, 1999, December 10, 1999, January 26, 2000, February 1, 2000, and March 3, 2000, Judgment Entries that appellant prosecutes this appeal, raising the following assignments of error:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO APPOINT COUNSEL FOR ELIZABETH (BETH) WATKINS, A MINOR, AT OR IMMEDIATELY DURING OR AFTER THE HEARING OF FEBRUARY 9, 1999, WHEN ELIZABETH (BETH) WATKINS WAS DETERMINED TO BE A DEPENDENT CHILD.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPOINT OR APPROVE RETAINED COUNSEL, DAVID L. DAY, AS COUNSEL FOR ELIZABETH (BETH) WATKINS, A MINOR, AND/OR IN DETERMINING THAT RETAINED COUNSEL COULD NOT REPRESENT ELIZABETH (BETH) WATKINS, A MINOR.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN APPOINTING ATTORNEY SUSAN CULTICE BROWN AS COUNSEL FOR ELIZABETH (BETH) WATKINS, A MINOR, ON AN INDIGENT BASIS WITHOUT FIRST DETERMINING THAT SAID MINOR WAS IN FACT INDIGENT.

The case has been assigned to the court's accelerated calendar. Before we can address the above assignments of error, we must address whether Attorney Day has standing to file this appeal. Pursuant to the common-law doctrine of standing, only those parties who can demonstrate a present interest in the subject matter of the litigation and who have been prejudiced by the lower court's decision have the right to file an appeal. Jenkins v. Gallipolis (1998), 128 Ohio App.3d 376, 381, citing Willoughby Hills v. C.C. Bar's Sahara (1992) 64 Ohio St.3d 24, 26. The burden of proof to establish standing rests with the party seeking to appeal. Id. While Attorney Day maintains that he represents Elizabeth for purposes of this appeal, we do not concur. As is stated above, Day was retained by Mary Harris, Elizabeth's step-grandmother, to represent Elizabeth in the custody proceedings. Since Elizabeth is a minor and, therefore, clearly cannot consent to Day's representation of her, Day, upon the advice of Attorney Charles Kettlewell, requested the trial court's consent to represent Elizabeth. As Day stated in his brief before this court, "the court's approval was necessary . . . because a child 6 years old is not of sufficient age to give such approval." The trial court, however, declined to appoint Attorney Day as counsel for Elizabeth, finding that there was "at minimum" the appearance of a conflict in Day's representation of Elizabeth. Clearly, based on the foregoing, Attorney Day has never represented Elizabeth in this matter and is not a party to these proceedings since he personally has no present interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Attorney Day, therefore, has no standing to bring this appeal.

The appeal filed by Attorney Day is, therefore, dismissed.

Wise, J. concur. Hoffman, P.J. concurs in part and dissents in part.

__________________________ Edwards, J.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion Attorney Day has no standing to challenge the trial court's decision denying approval of him as counsel for the minor. Having been retained by the minor's step-grandmother to do so, I believe Attorney Day has a cognizable interest and standing to challenge the trial court's decision not to approve or recognize his representation of the minor. Having so concluded, I would overrule Attorney Day's second assignment of error on the merits. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not approving his representation of the minor for the reasons set forth in its March 3, 2000 Judgment Entry quoted in the Majority Opinion, supra. Having determined the trial court did not err in not approving Attorney Day as attorney for the minor, I concur with the majority Attorney Day has no standing to raise the first and third assignments of error.