Trumbull Savings Loan Co. v. Vaccar, Unpublished Decision (11-21-2001)
Trumbull Savings Loan Co. v. Vaccar, Unpublished Decision (11-21-2001)
Opinion of the Court
In 1985, Stanley Dombrosky and his wife, Nancy J. Dombrosky, opened a joint account with a right of survivorship, consisting of a C.D. designated as account number 01210650, at the Trumbull Savings and Loan Company now known as the Second National Bank of Warren, Ohio ("the bank"). Mr. Dombrosky died in October 1993, leaving Nancy Dombrosky the sole owner of the account.
This account remained unchanged in the names of Stanley and Nancy Dombrosky until February 18, 1998. On that day, Mrs. Dombrosky and her sister Vaccar went to the bank with the purpose of amending the account. Kelli L. Stanar ("Stanar"), an authorized bank employee, helped Mrs. Dombrosky complete an account change form, authorizing the bank to delete her deceased husband's name from the account and replace it with her sister's name. Mrs. Dombrosky presented her husband's death certificate and, in the presence of Stanar, because of arthritis in her hands, expressly authorized Vaccar to finish signing her name to the account change form. The bank accepted the account change form.
After Mrs. Dombrosky's death, in April 1998, and a challenge to the disposition of the CD, the Trumbull Savings and Loan Company filed an interpleader action, requesting that the court determine who was entitled to the proceeds. Appellant, a beneficiary of Mrs. Dombrosky's will, intervened seeking a declaratory judgment. Vaccar filed a counterclaim. A bench trial was held on August 25, 1999. On August 30, a judgment entry was filed, finding that the C.D. was a joint and survivorship account, and ordering that the funds be disbursed to Vaccar. From this judgment, appellant assigns the following assignments of error:
"[1.] The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the certificate of deposit account in the names of Nancy Dombrosky and Rose Marie Vaccar was a joint and survivorship account.
"[2.] The trial court's judgment is contrary to R.C.
1107.08 (B) and R.C.2131.10 ."[3.] The judgment of the trial court was against the manifest weight of the evidence."
In appellant's first assignment of error, she contends that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to apply the precedent set forth in Wright v. Bloom (1994),
69 Ohio St.3d 596 . She argues that the account did not contain a right of survivorship and, thus, should be included in the decedent's estate. Appellee asserts that, since Stanley and Nancy Dombrosky opened a joint account with right of survivorship, which was amended in 1998, solely by replacing Vaccar's name on the account for Stanley's, it remained a joint account with a right of survivorship.
Appellate courts review questions of law under a de novo standard.Long Beach Assn., Inc. v. Jones (1998),
In Wright, supra, at the second paragraph of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held:
"The opening of a joint and survivorship account in the absence of fraud, duress, undue influence or lack of capacity on the part of the decedent is conclusive evidence of his or her intention to transfer to the surviving party or parties a survivorship interest in the balance remaining in the account at his or her death. (In re Estate of Thompson [1981], 66 Ohio 2d 433, 20 O.O 3d 371,
423 N.E.2d 90 , paragraph two of the syllabus, overruled.)"
Since the record is devoid of any assertion of fraud, duress, undue influence, or lack of capacity, we conclude that, upon Mrs. Dombrosky's death, the account passed to Vaccar, by virtue of her right of survivorship. Additionally, in Wright, supra, the court adopted the presumptions in Sections 6-103(a) and 6-104(a) of the Uniform Probate Code, which embody the assumption that the average depositor utilizes a joint and survivorship account as a non-probate device to dispose of property at death while retaining control during her lifetime. While the trial court relied on Fecteau v. Cleveland Trust Co. (1960),
In appellant's second assignment of error, she contends that the trial court's judgment is contrary to R.C.
In her third assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court's judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. "Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence." C.E. MorrisCo. v. Foley Construction Co. (1978),
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas.
JUDGE ROBERT A. NADER
CHRISTLEY, P.J., GRENDELL, J., concur.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.