OPINION

I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR IN SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.

b) The harm caused by the multiple offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of a single course of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.

c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.

During the sentencing hearing, the trial court found consecutive sentences were appropriate "because of the plan used, the great harm that was caused psychologically to these people." March 4, 1997 T. at 8. In its judgment entry on sentencing filed March 4, 1997, the trial court found "[t]he defendant's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that the defendant is likely to commit future crimes, and does not demonstrate remorse." While the trial court did not set forth the "magic words" of the statute, we find the trial court's findings, when taken together, fulfill the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(E)(3).

Appellant's sole assignment of error is denied. The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio is hereby affirmed.

__________ Farmer, J.

Gwin, J. concurs.

Edwards, P.J. dissents.

I respectfully dissent from the majority in its analysis and disposition of the appellant's sole assignment of error. In State v. Edmonson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324, the Ohio Supreme Court found that "[t]he structure of the various sentencing statutes suggests that the General Assembly approached felony sentencing by mandating a record reflecting that judges considered certain factors and presumptions to confirm that the court's decision-making process included all of the statutorily required sentencing considerations." Edmonson at p. 327. While Edmonson post dates the case sub judice, Edmonson does deal with the purpose of the sentencing statutes. Those statutes have undergone some modifications between the date of the offense in the case sub judice and the Edmonson case, but none of those modifications have been drastic enough to indicate that the Edmonson rationale is not relevant to an interpretation of the purpose of the sentencing statutes. Therefore, I would conclude that the trial court in the case sub judice, in imposing consecutive service, should have indicated in the record that it considered R.C. 2929.14(E)(3) and should have specified and set forth the statutory language it used to support that sentence. I find that in the case sub judice the trial court did not do this. Neither on the record at the sentencing hearing nor in the March 4, 1997, Sentencing Judgment Entry did the trial court conclude that consecutive service was necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender. Nor did the trial court state that the seriousness of the offenses required consecutive service, or that the danger posed to the public by the offender was great. Finally, the record reveals that the trial court failed to make any of the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(E)(3)(a) through (c) prior to imposing consecutive sentences on appellant. R.C.2929.14(E)(3) is not referred to at the sentencing hearing nor in the sentencing Judgment Entry. In sum, I would find that the trial court erred in not specifying the statutory language that it used to support the imposition of consecutive service. I would, therefore, sustain appellant's sole assignment of error, vacate appellant's sentence and remand this matter to the trial court for resentencing.

______________________ Julie A. Edwards, P.J.