OPINION

I IN ITS JUDGMENT ENTRY OF JULY 7, 2000, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ENFORCE THE MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF R.C. 1343.03, WHICH REQUIRES A SETTLING DEFENDANT TO PAY INTEREST ON THE SETTLEMENT.

In its judgment entry of July 7, 2000, the trial court denied appellant's request stating the following: While counsel for the plaintiff is correct that this matter was settled on June 5, 2000, during trial, and the terms of the settlement were memorialized by the making of a record concerning the terms of this settlement, the settlement was not journalized. Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 1343.03(A) and (B), the interest in question is to be computed from the date the judgment decree or order is rendered.

R.C. 1343.03 states, in pertinent part:

(A) In cases other than those provided for in sections 1343.01 and1343.02 of the Revised Code, when money becomes due and payable upon * * * any settlement between parties, * * * and upon all judgments, decrees, and orders of any judicial tribunal for the payment of money arising out of tortious conduct or a contract or other transaction, the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum, and no more, unless a written contract provides a different rate of interest in relation to the money that becomes due and payable, in which case the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate provided in that contract.

(B) Except as provided in divisions (C) and (D) of this section, interest on a judgment, decree, or order for the payment of money rendered in a civil action based on tortious conduct, including but not limited to a civil action based on tortious conduct that has been settled by agreement of the parties, shall be computed from the date the judgment, decree, or order is rendered to the date on which the money is paid. (Emphasis added).

Appellant urges this Court to find that subsection (A) of the statute requires the imposition of post-judgment interest to commence upon the date of settlement. Appellees maintain R.C. 1343.03(B) governs this action and allows post-judgment interest only after journalization of the settlement. Upon review, we concur with the reasoning of appellees and the trial court. After the matter was settled, the trial court dismissed the action. There was no decree or judgment filed upon which interest could be computed from. In fact, to date, there is no judgment or settlement memorialized in the record. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to enforce interest. The sole assignment of error is denied. The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County Ohio is hereby affirmed. By Farmer, J. and Gwin, P.J. concur. Hoffman, J. dissents.

I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes R.C. 1343.03 (B) controls the instant matter. While I agree subsection (B) may control the ultimate resolution of the matter, the record does not eliminate the possibility R.C. 1343.03(A) may apply and result ininterest accruing prior to the time established under R.C. 1343.03(B). In her June 22, 2000 Motion to Enforce Interest, appellant argues the settlement agreement was "immediately due and payable." (Motion to Enforce at 1). In direct contravention of this statement, appellee's June 27, 2000 Response to [Appellant's] Motion to Enforce Interest states: "On June 5, 2000, the first morning of trial, the parties reached an agreement to settle this matter. At that time, there was no discussion amongst the parties of a set timeframe in which the checks must be issued." (Response at 1). Neither party sets forth the terms of the settlement as entered on the record. In light of the parties conflicting positions, I find this action may be governed by R.C. 1343.03(A). The clear language of the statute provides for the imposition of interest after settlement "when money becomes due and payable." This may be before the settlement is reduced to judgment, decree or order, and filed for record with the clerk, as stated in subsection (A). This also may or may not be the date of settlement. When the money is "due and payable" is a term that may be expressly agreed upon within the context of the settlement. If the settlement agreement does not provide a date upon which the money becomes due and payable, contract law would imply a reasonable time period for such payment. Appellant failed to file a transcript documenting the terms of the settlement. As such, I cannot discern from this record when the settlement proceeds became "due and payable." However, based upon the trial court's July 2, 2000 Judgment Entry, the terms of the settlement were memorialized on the record. Accordingly, I find the trial court erred in limiting its analysis to R.C. 1343.03(B). I would reverse and remand this matter to the trial court to consider whether the money became due and payable under R.C. 1343.03(A) before June 30, 2000. I would sustain appellant's sole assignment of error.

WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN