State v. D'ambrosio, Unpublished Decision (11-02-2001)
State v. D'ambrosio, Unpublished Decision (11-02-2001)
Opinion of the Court
As required by App.R. 26(B)(2)(b), D'Ambrosio must establish "a showing of good cause for untimely filing if the application is filed more than ninety days after journalization of the appellate judgment" which is subject to reopening. State v. Cooey (1995),
Notwithstanding the fact that the application for reopening was not timely filed, a substantive review of D'Ambrosio's supporting brief fails to disclose that there exists a genuine issue as to whether he was deprived of the effective assistance of appellate counsel. Specifically, D'Ambrosio argues that his original appeal should be reopened since the Supreme Court of Ohio established in State v. Pless (1996),
"Absent strict compliance with the requirements of R.C.
2945.05 a trial court lacks jurisdiction to try the defendant without a jury." (Citations omitted.)
Id., paragraph one of the syllabus.
D'Ambrosio argues that strict compliance with the requirements of R.C.
The argument, as presently raised by D'Ambrosio, has been previously raised through other applications for reopening and found to be without merit. See State v. Kurincic (Nov. 30, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 68246, unreported, reopening disallowed (Aug. 14, 1996), Motion No. 71617; Statev. Munici (Nov. 30, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 52579, unreported, reopening disallowed (Aug. 21, 1996), Motion No. 68671; State v. Canitia (June 17, 1993), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 62492 and 62639, unreported, reopening disallowed (Aug. 29, 1996), Motion No. 71997; State v. Bekovich (Apr. 10, 1986), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 5008, 50068, and 50118, unreported, reopening disallowed (Oct. 28, 1996), Motion No. 73125.
A review of the two exhibits attached to D'Ambrosio's application for reopening clearly demonstrates that the trial court properly complied with R.C.
The opinions rendered by this court in Kurincic, Munici, Canitia, andBekovich clearly provide that appellate counsel cannot be declared ineffective for failing to anticipate the future development of the law in the area of jury waiver by the Supreme Court of Ohio. The jury waiver procedure employed by the trial court in 1988, with regard to D'Ambrosio's decision to waive his right to a jury trial, was proper. Thus, D'Ambrosio has failed to establish that "there is a genuine issue as to whether the applicant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal." App.R. 26(B)(5); Strickland v. Washington (1984),
Accordingly, we deny D'Ambrosio's application for reopening.
KENNETH A. ROCCO, P.J., CONCURS. JAMES J. SWEENEY. J., CONCURS.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.