McClellan v. McClellan, Unpublished Decision (11-13-2002)
McClellan v. McClellan, Unpublished Decision (11-13-2002)
Opinion of the Court
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made: {¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant Gene McClellan ("Husband") has appealed from a decision of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, which affirmed a magistrate's decision that awarded continued spousal support to Defendant-Appellee Christine McClellan ("Wife"). This Court affirms.
{¶ 3} "As and for spousal support to be paid herein by Husband to Wife, Husband shall pay to Wife, subject to further order, commencing on the date a decree of divorce is granted adopting the terms of this Separation Agreement, the sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per week, together with poundage, through the Summit County Child Support Enforcement Agency, by wage assignment."
{¶ 4} The separation agreement also provided that Husband's obligation to pay spousal support was subject to further order of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, and was terminable upon (1) further order of the court specifically terminating Husband's obligation; (2) the death of Husband; (3) the death of Wife; or (4) the remarriage of Wife. The Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division retained jurisdiction to modify the amount of the spousal support payments.
{¶ 5} On July 14, 2001, almost four years after the parties were divorced, Husband terminated his job with the Akron Beacon Journal. His income went from $42,000 a year to approximately $21,9481 a year. Wife, on the other hand, improved her situation after the divorce. When spousal support was initially granted, Wife was in school and unemployed. However, when Husband's employment was terminated Wife was working part-time as a desk clerk at a hotel, earning approximately $10,752 a year.
{¶ 6} As a result of Husband's change in employment status, he filed a motion to modify/terminate spousal support. A hearing was held on the matter on October 23, 2001, in which he argued that due to his retirement, his income was substantially reduced and Wife's income now exceeded the former spousal support level. The residing magistrate rendered a decision on November 29, 2001, wherein the magistrate held: "Effective July 18, 2001, Plaintiff's obligation to pay spousal support is reduced to $325 per month plus the processing fees." Husband timely filed objections to the magistrate's decision. The trial court overruled Husband's objections and adopted the magistrate's decision. Husband has appealed, asserting one assignment of error.
{¶ 7} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND FACT IN ARBITRARILY CONTINUING THE AWARD OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT AS BEING APPROPRIATE AND REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES."
{¶ 8} In Husband's sole assignment of error, he has argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law in arbitrarily continuing the award of spousal support. We disagree.
{¶ 9} A trial court has wide latitude in awarding spousal support; however, a court's evaluation is constrained by R.C.
{¶ 10} "In determining whether spousal support is appropriate and reasonable, and in determining the nature, amount, and terms of payment, and duration of spousal support * * * the court shall consider the following factors:
{¶ 11} "(a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but not limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed, or distributed[;]
{¶ 12} "(b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;
{¶ 13} "(c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the parties;
{¶ 14} "(d) The retirement benefits of the parties;
{¶ 15} "(e) The duration of the marriage;
{¶ 16} "(f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because that party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek employment outside the home;
{¶ 17} "(g) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;
{¶ 18} "(h) The relative extent of education of the parties.
{¶ 19} "(i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties;
{¶ 20} "(j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited to, any party's contribution to the acquisition of a professional agree of the other party;
{¶ 21} "(k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the education, training, or job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought;
{¶ 22} "(l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal support;
{¶ 23} "(m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted from that party's marital responsibilities;
{¶ 24} "(n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable."
{¶ 25} A trial court is bound to consider all the factors contained in R.C.
{¶ 26} In the instant case, the parties' separation agreement contained a provision by which the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division retained continuing jurisdiction to modify the amount of spousal support. Therefore, the magistrate had authority to modify the award upon a showing of changed circumstances pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 27} This Court has previously held that need is not a basis for an award of spousal support. Noll v. Noll (June 7, 2000), 9th Dist. No. 98CA007042, at 4. The only relevant question is what is appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances, and once the fourteen factors under R.C.
{¶ 28} Additionally, Husband has argued that $325 a month "is nothing more than an arbitrary figure arrived [at] without the benefit of the factors contained in R.C.
{¶ 29} In regard to Husband's charge that the trial court simply recited the magistrate's decision without explaining how the amount of spousal support was calculated, we note that "the judge may not merely rubberstamp the decision of the [magistrate] to whom [a] matter was referred." Herman v. Herman (June 24, 1981), 12th Dist. Nos. 343 384, 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 14504, at *4. However, in this case, the record reflects that the trial court independently scrutinized the magistrate's decision.
{¶ 30} In concluding that continued spousal support was appropriate, the trial court specifically cited the relevant factors as set forth in R.C.
{¶ 31} Although the trial court did not cite to every factor listed in R.C.
SLABY, P.J., BAIRD, J. CONCUR.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.