State v. Enfinger, Unpublished Decision (3-5-2003)
State v. Enfinger, Unpublished Decision (3-5-2003)
Opinion of the Court
{¶ 2} On October 31, 2000, defendant-appellant, Willie Enfinger, pleaded guilty to one count of gross sexual imposition pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 3} On March 18, 2002, Enfinger filed a motion to terminate probation. In that motion, he argued that because the maximum sentence he could have received was eighteen months' incarceration and that the Alvis House program was equivalent to confinement, he had served his sentence and was entitled to be released. At a hearing, the evidence showed that the Alvis House program took two years to complete, and that Enfinger had only been there for approximately seven months. After hearing evidence about the rules and conditions of the treatment program, the trial court overruled Enfinger's motion to terminate probation.
{¶ 4} In his sole assignment of error, Enfinger contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to terminate his probation. He argues that the evidence showed that the conditions at Alvis House constituted "confinement" and that he was entitled to credit for his time served there. This assignment of error is not well taken.
{¶ 5} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that time spent at a residential treatment facility does not constitute "confinement" for the purpose of granting jail-time credit. State v. Nagle (1986),
{¶ 6} The evidence showed that while the Alvis House programs placed some restrictions upon the conduct of its residents for their safety and the safety of the surrounding community, those restrictions were not so onerous or stringent as to constitute confinement. SeeNagle, supra; State v. Jones (June 25, 1998), 5th Dist. No. 97 CA 107. Consequently, Enfinger was not entitled to credit for the time he spent at Alvis House, and the trial court did not err in overruling his motion to terminate probation. We overrule his sole assignment of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
{¶ 7} Further, a certified copy of this Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate, which shall be sent to the trial court under App. R. 27. Costs shall be taxed under App. R. 24.
Doan, P.J., Gorman and Sundermann, JJ.
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