{¶ 2} Appellant assigns as error:

{¶ 3} "I. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and therefore erred in granting appellee's request for a writ of restitution."

{¶ 4} This case comes to us on the accelerated calendar. App. R. 11.1, which governs accelerated calender cases, provides, in pertinent part:

{¶ 5} "(E) Determination and judgment on appeal.

{¶ 6} "The appeal will be determined as provided by App. R. 11.1. It shall be sufficient compliance with App. R. 12(A) for the statement of the reason for the court's decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary form.

{¶ 7} "The decision may be by judgment entry in which case it will not be published in any form."

{¶ 8} This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned rule.

{¶ 10} We find Godbelt to have been wrongly decided. It is clear the municipal court has original subject matter jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer actions. We conclude the notice required by R.C. 1923.04(A) is one of the necessary elements to be proved by the landlord at trial in order to succeed on a complaint for a writ of restitution. While an essential element of the landlord's claim, its absence does not divest the municipal court of subject matter jurisdiction to determine the landlord's complaint.

{¶ 11} Appellant's assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 12} The judgment of the Mansfield Municipal Court is affirmed.

Hoffman, P.J., Edwards, J. concurs separately.

Wise, J. dissents.

{¶ 13} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

{¶ 14} Following the precedent set by this court in Godbeltv. McClain (Nov. 5, 1995), Licking App. No. 94-CA-0066, I find the three-day-notice requirement is a jurisdictional requirement. Other appellate districts have reached the same conclusion. SeeCincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Morgan, 155 Ohio App.3d 189,193, 2003-Ohio-5671; Velanosky v. White (Jan. 26, 1995), Cuyahoga App. No. 67479, at 2; Knoll Grp. Mgmt. Co. v. Wolfe (June 28, 1994), Adams App No. 93 CA 553, 93 CA 554, at 4;Crigger v. Shaw (Feb. 25, 1994), Erie App. No. E-93-62, at 2;Chillicothe Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Anderson (June 28, 1988), Ross App. No. 1406, at 5; Smith v. Lydia (Nov. 19, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 52982, at 1; Gibbes v. Freeman (Sept. 3, 1987), Cuyahoga App. No. 52745, at 2; Label Co. v. Hyde (Aug. 20, 1986), Columbiana App. No. 85-C-63, at 2; and FMJ Propertiesv. Hinton (Apr. 10, 1986), Cuyahoga App. No. 50314, at 2.

{¶ 15} I concur in the disposition of this case by Judge Hoffman, but differ in my analysis.

{¶ 16} I find that the appellant lost his ability to challenge the sufficiency of the notice to vacate under R.C.1923.04. The Magistrate, in his August 29, 2003, proposed decision, found that the "Defendant has been duly served with the required notice to leave pursuant to O.R.C. 1923.04." The trial court, in its March 9, 2004, Judgment Entry, stated: "The Court notes that the Objections filed by the parties were not filed with a supporting transcript of specific evidence submitted to the Magistrate relevant to the Objection. Therefore, the Court adopts the findings by the Magistrate as the complete finding of fact in this matter."

{¶ 17} Civil Rule 53(E)(3)(c) sets forth that "[a]ny objection to a finding of fact shall be supported by a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that fact or an affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is unavailable." The appellant, who fails to provide a transcript of the original hearing before the magistrate for the trial court's review, cannot attack on appeal findings made by the magistrate and adopted by the trial court. See Channell v. Matyaszek (June 16, 2003) Stark App. No. 2002CA00440, 2003 WL 21398875 (Ohio App. 5 Dist.).

For the reason stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the March 9, 2004 Judgment Entry of the Mansfield Municipal Court is affirmed. Costs assessed to appellant.