State v. Baranowski, Unpublished Decision (11-18-2005)
State v. Baranowski, Unpublished Decision (11-18-2005)
Opinion of the Court
{¶ 2} On April 27, 2005, appellant, Rodney Baranowski, was indicted on a charge of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} Appellant sets forth the following single assignment of error:
{¶ 4} "The trial court abused its discretion when it denied appellant's motions to withdraw plea."
{¶ 5} This court reviews the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea on the basis of whether the trial court abused its discretion. There is no guaranteed right to withdraw a guilty plea, therefore it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine the circumstances justifying a grant of the motion. State v. Peterseim (1980),
{¶ 6} This court has used the following four prong test as the standard to determine abuse of discretion in denying a withdrawal of a guilty plea:
{¶ 7} "A trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion to withdraw: (1) where the accused is represented by highly competent counsel, (2) where the accused was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim. R. 11, before he entered the plea, (3) when, after the motion to withdraw is filed, the accused is given a complete and impartial hearing on the motion, and (4) where the record reveals that the court gave full and fair consideration to the plea withdrawal request." State v. Sage (Feb. 1, 1985), 6th Dist. No. 10443; citing Statev. Peterseim (1980),
{¶ 8} First, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary, a properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. Vaughn v. Maxwell
(1965),
{¶ 9} Second, appellant was afforded a full hearing, pursuant to Crim. R. 11, before entering the guilty plea. According to the record, appellant entered the plea voluntarily and he understood the nature of the charges and the penalty imposed. Furthermore, appellant stated he understood the effect of the plea and that the court will proceed to sentencing. Finally, appellant stated that he understood that upon entering the plea, he waived his right to a jury trial, confrontation of witnesses, compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and the requirement of the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt where appellant himself cannot be forced to testify against himself.
{¶ 10} Third, appellant was afforded a complete and impartial hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea. After changing counsel, appellant was able to call his former attorney as a witness to communication issues between appellant and former counsel. The trial court heard arguments from appellant's new counsel and appellee regarding the motion. Thus, the record shows the hearing was complete and impartial.
{¶ 11} Finally, the court gave full and fair consideration to the request for withdrawal of the motion. The court acknowledged that it was favorably disposed to grant release to appellant to tend to his business affairs. However, the release was not included in the plea agreement, and therefore the guilty plea was not entered on the condition of his release. Furthermore, after the hearing where appellant entered his plea, the court became aware that appellant was attempting to contact the child victim and upon release appellant was planning to leave the jurisdiction with the victim. The record shows that the trial court considered fully the request to withdraw the plea but since the release was not part of the plea agreement, and appellant threatened to leave the jurisdiction with the child victim, the court denied the motion.
{¶ 12} Since appellant fails to show that any of the four prongs was absent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion upon denying the motion to change a guilty plea.
{¶ 13} The judgment of the Williams County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. Judgment for the clerk's expense incurred in preparation of the record, fees allowed by law, and the fee for filing the appeal is awarded to Williams County.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4, amended 1/1/98.
Singer, Skow, and Parish, J., concur.
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