State v. Blake, Unpublished Decision (1-3-2005)
State v. Blake, Unpublished Decision (1-3-2005)
Opinion of the Court
{¶ 2} In February 2004, was indicted on two counts of rape, R.C.
{¶ 3} The trial court thereafter concluded that appellant was a sexual predator and issued a judgment entry to that effect on April 8, 2004. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on April 27, 2004, and herein raises the following sole Assignment of Error:
{¶ 4} "I. The court erred when it classified appellant as a sexual predator without a record of clear and convincing evidence to support said finding."
{¶ 6} In State v. Cook (1998),
{¶ 7} "(3) In making a determination under divisions (B)(1) and (4) of this section as to whether an offender or delinquent child is a sexual predator, the judge shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, all of the following: (a) The offender's or delinquent child's age; (b) The offender's or delinquent child's prior criminal or delinquency record regarding all offenses, including, but not limited to, all sexual offenses; (c) The age of the victim of the sexually oriented offense for which sentence is to be imposed or the order of disposition is to be made; (d) Whether the sexually oriented offense for which sentence is to be imposed or the order of disposition is to be made involved multiple victims; (e) Whether the offender or delinquent child used drugs or alcohol to impair the victim of the sexually oriented offense or to prevent the victim from resisting; (f) If the offender or delinquent child previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to, or been adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that if committed by an adult would be, a criminal offense, whether the offender or delinquent child completed any sentence or dispositional order imposed for the prior offense or act and, if the prior offense or act was a sex offense or a sexually oriented offense, whether the offender or delinquent child participated in available programs for sexual offenders; (g) Any mental illness or mental disability of the offender or delinquent child; (h) The nature of the offender's or delinquent child's sexual conduct, sexual contact, or interaction in a sexual context with the victim of the sexually oriented offense and whether the sexual conduct, sexual contact, or interaction in a sexual context was part of a demonstrated pattern of abuse; (i) Whether the offender or delinquent child, during the commission of the sexually oriented offense for which sentence is to be imposed or the order of disposition is to be made, displayed cruelty or made one or more threats of cruelty; (j) Any additional behavioral characteristics that contribute to the offender's or delinquent child's conduct."
{¶ 8} During the classification hearing, a North Canton police officer testified to details concerning appellant's confession. Appellant had admitted to the officer that he engaged in fellatio with the male child victim on two occasions in April 2003. On the first occasion, appellant, age 34, was looking at pornographic images on a computer, while the victim, then age four, was sitting on his lap. The victim then performed fellatio on him. During the second incident, appellant was watching a pornographic video and masturbating. The victim was sleeping on the same couch, when, according to appellant, he awoke and began to perform fellatio on appellant. Appellant indicated that the victim had been entrusted to his care by the child's mother during these events. Appellant also admitted to performing fellatio on the same victim two years prior to the 2003 incidents, also during a time when he was acting as a caretaker for the child, then two years of age.
{¶ 9} Appellant points out that he had already begun counseling for his pornography addiction, and attempts to persuade us that there was no evidence as to further likelihood of re-offending (see R.C.
{¶ 10} Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court considered the elements set forth in R.C.
{¶ 11} Appellant's sole Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶ 12} For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Stark County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed.
Wise, J. Gwin, P.J., and Boggins, J., concur.
Costs to appellant.
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