State v. Kerns
Cases that cite this one
7 later published cases cite this decision.
- State v. Kerns, 06ca3124 (7-27-2007) (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)
- State v. Evans (Ohio Ct. App. 2020)
- State v. Toma (Ohio Ct. App. 2014)
- State v. Jeremy Kerns, Unpublished Decision (8-8-2006) (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)
- State v. Brooks, Unpublished Decision (9-21-2005) (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
- State v. Watkins (Ohio Ct. App. 2020)
- State v. Pitts, Unpublished Decision (2-24-2006) (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Scioto County Common Pleas Court judgment of conviction and sentence. A jury found Elvis Presley Jeremy Kerns, defendant-appellant, guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of R.C.
{¶ 2} The following errors are assigned for review:
First Assignment of Error:
Appellant's sentence is contrary to law because the record does not support the court's findings that a minimum sentence would demean the seriousness of the offense.
Second Assignment of Error:
Appellant's sentence is contrary to law because the trial court failed to follow the proper statutory procedure for felony sentencing.
{¶ 3} In the evening of July 6, 2003, and into the early morning of July 7, a disturbance arose at the Farley Square apartments in Portsmouth. The disturbance began when someone's dog defecated in another resident's yard. This situation escalated to a standoff between two groups of residents — each shouting racial epithets at the other. Sometime during that confrontation, appellant and his wife, Amy Kerns, emerged from their apartment and joined in the fray.1 While the Kernses were outside, someone threw a beer can that hit appellant's wife in the head. Police eventually arrived and told the crowd to return to their apartments.
{¶ 4} The next day, appellant and his wife left their apartment to go to the doctor. In the complex parking lot they were approached by Carlton Cave. The two men exchanged words, and Cave began to punch appellant in the face.2 Amy Kerns tried to step between them, and, during that momentary interlude, her husband drew a knife. Cave then tried to withdraw, but appellant chased Cave through the parking lot and finally caught him. The two men tussled, and Cave suffered a fatal stab wound. He died at the scene. Appellant took his wife to the doctor and then fled the area. Authorities apprehended appellant five months later.
{¶ 5} The Scioto County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging appellant with murder in violation of R.C.
{¶ 6} Appellant testified in his own defense and stated that he had been trying to protect his wife. Appellant claimed that he had chased Cave through the parking lot to tell him that did not want any more trouble, not to inflict injury. As to the stabbing, appellant's testimony was somewhat unclear. At one point, appellant claimed that he could not recall when he had stabbed Cave. At another point, appellant claimed that the stabbing had been an accident and Cave had fallen on the knife.
{¶ 7} The jury found appellant not guilty of murder but guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of R.C.
{¶ 9} Our analysis begins with R.C.
{¶ 10} Initially, we note that it is not clear from the record whether appellant has been previously sentenced to prison. Because both parties and the trial court operated under the assumption that he had not, we will do so as well for purposes of our review.
{¶ 11} Given that appellant has not previously been sentenced to prison, he should have been sentenced to the minimum possible sentence under R.C.
{¶ 12} Nevertheless, appellant argues that the record does not support such a finding. Appellant points to the sole seriousness factor cited by the court (a racial motivation for the slaying) and argues that this is insufficient to support the court's finding. We note, however, that a trial court is not required to give its reasons for finding that a minimum sentence would demean the seriousness of an offense. Edmonson, supra at the syllabus;State v. Comer,
{¶ 13} Appellant further argues that the record is insufficient to support a finding that the homicide was racially motivated. He refers to an instance when the state cross-examined Amy Kerns on her use of the word "boys" to describe African-Americans. Appellant claims that this is a harmless colloquialism that should not be misconstrued as a racial slur or evidence that the homicide was racially motivated. However, appellant's argument seriously understates the evidence in the record from which one may infer that this crime was racially motivated. The evidence was uncontroverted that appellant and his wife were part of the standoff in the incident that occurred at Farley Square on July 6 and 7. Portsmouth Police Officer Douglas Kelly identified appellant as one of the people who had been yelling racial slurs. Moreover, Portsmouth Police Detective James Charles related that appellant had called Farley Square "one big black family." In a taped interview with police that was played during trial, appellant said that he had not slept the night of the incident at Farley Square because he was afraid that black people would stake out his apartment and that he had not turned himself in to police because he was afraid that black people would purposely get themselves arrested in order to get into jail to get him. This evidence does indicate a racial component in the slaying.
{¶ 14} Moreover, although the trial court did not expressly refer to it, another important fact could have factored into the court's decision. The evidence revealed that Cave had been the initial aggressor in this incident but that appellant had not stabbed Cave when the fight first broke out. Rather, the two men were separated, and appellant had the opportunity to pull the knife. Cave attempted to withdraw when he saw the knife, and appellant chased after Cave, tracked him down, and stabbed him. This fact may well have factored into the court's determination that a minimum prison sentence would demean the seriousness of the offense. In light of appellant's decision to chase the victim, rather than permitting him to retreat, and considering the evidence of a racial motivation *Page 81 for the crime, we believe that ample evidence exists in the record to support the trial court's determination that a minimum sentence demeans the seriousness of this offense.
{¶ 15} Accordingly, we conclude that appellant's first assignment of error is without merit and is hereby overruled.
{¶ 17} R.C.
(1) The physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of the offense due to the conduct of the offender was exacerbated because of the physical or mental condition or age of the victim.
(2) The victim of the offense suffered serious physical, psychological, or economic harm as a result of the offense.
(3) The offender held a public office or position of trust in the community, and the offense related to that office or position.
(4) The offender's occupation, elected office, or profession obliged the offender to prevent the offense or bring others committing it to justice.
(5) The offender's professional reputation or occupation, elected office, or profession was used to facilitate the offense or is likely to influence the future conduct of others.
(6) The offender's relationship with the victim facilitated the offense.
(7) The offender committed the offense for hire or as a part of an organized criminal activity.
(8) In committing the offense, the offender was motivated by prejudice based on race, ethnic background, gender, sexual orientation, or religion.
(9) If the offense is a violation of section
2919.25 or a violation of section2903.11 ,2903.12 , or2903.13 of the Revised Code involving a person who was a family or household member at the time of the violation, the offender committed *Page 82 the offense in the vicinity of one or more children who are not victims of the offense, and the offender or the victim of the offense is a parent, guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of one or more of those children.
{¶ 18} Factors that tend to make a crime less serious are set out in R.C.
(1) The victim induced or facilitated the offense.
(2) In committing the offense, the offender acted under strong provocation.
(3) In committing the offense, the offender did not cause or expect to cause physical harm to any person or property.
(4) There are substantial grounds to mitigate the offender's conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense.
{¶ 19} Although the sentencing entry in this case makes an oblique reference to the effect that the trial court considered those factors set out in R.C.
{¶ 20} We recognize that R.C.
{¶ 21} As mentioned above, although the trial court referred to R.C.
{¶ 22} The state counters by referring, again, to theEdmonson syllabus and argues that the trial court is not required to specifically discuss the R.C.
{¶ 23} Further, as we state above, we do not require trial courts to provide a factor-by-factor analysis of the statute. As long as the record provides some inference that the court considered the R.C.
{¶ 24} For these reasons, we hereby sustain appellant's second assignment of error. We emphasize, however, that we do not pass on the propriety of imposing a nine-year sentence in this case. Rather, we hold only that the trial court has not demonstrated that it considered the requisite statutory factors before it imposed that sentence.
{¶ 25} Having sustained the second assignment of error, the trial court's sentencing judgment is hereby reversed, and this matter is remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.4
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded.
HARSHA, J., concurs. *Page 84
KLINE, J., concurs in the judgment and in the opinion as to its discussion of assignment of error I and dissents as to its discussion of assignment of error II.
Concurring Opinion
concurs in the judgment and in the opinion as to its discussion of assignment of error I and dissents as to its discussion of assignment of error II.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.