State v. Rufus, Unpublished Decision (9-29-2006)
State v. Rufus, Unpublished Decision (9-29-2006)
Opinion of the Court
{¶ 2} On December 6, 2005, the Lake County Court of Common Pleas sentenced appellant on three separate cases. Appellant had previously entered guilty pleas in all three matters. Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for a total of seventeen years and eleven months as described below.
{¶ 3} Case No. 05-CR-000661:1 Appellant was sentenced to nine years imprisonment for aggravated robbery, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C.
{¶ 4} Case No. 05-CR-000392:3 Appellant was sentenced to eleven months imprisonment for escape, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C.
{¶ 5} Case No. 05-CR-000530:4 Appellant was sentenced to two years imprisonment for felonious assault, a felony of the second degree in violation of R.C.
{¶ 6} All sentences were ordered to run consecutive to one another.
{¶ 7} Appellant asserts the following assignments of error:
{¶ 8} "[1.] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT IMPOSED A MORE SEVERE SENTENCE AFTER FINDING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OBJECTION TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S ORIGINAL SENTENCE WELL TAKEN.
{¶ 9} "[2.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO A MORE-THAN-THE-MINIMUM, CONSECTUIVE SENTENCE BASED UPON A FINDING OF FACTORS NOT FOUND BY THE JURY OR ADMITTED BY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IN VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO TRIAL BY JURY."
{¶ 10} We will address appellant's second assignment of error first as its disposition renders the first assignment of error moot.
{¶ 11} Appellant was sentenced on December 6, 2005 in all three underlying cases. The Ohio Supreme Court decided State v.Foster,
{¶ 12} In imposing more-than-the-minimum and consecutive sentences upon appellant, the trial court relied in part on R.C.
{¶ 13} However, Foster did not invalidate the entire Ohio sentencing scheme. The court determined that severing the unconstitutional provisions of the code would serve as an appropriate remedy. "All references to mandatory judicial fact-finding properly may be eliminated in the four areas of concern." Foster at ¶ 96. After severance, R.C.
{¶ 14} After the severance of the applicable statutes, the trial court is entrusted with full discretion in meting out sentences. Less than three months after appellant was sentenced, the decision in Foster was released. As a result, appellant's sentences are void and must be vacated and remanded for re-sentencing. Id. at ¶ 103-104. Upon remand, the trial court is no longer required to make findings or give its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences or more-than-the-minimum sentences. Id. at paragraph seven of the syllabus. "Courts shall consider those portions of the sentencing code that are unaffected by today's decision and impose any sentence within the appropriate felony range." Id. at ¶ 105. The discretion is left to the trial court. "While the defendants may argue for reductions in their sentences, nothing prevents the state from seeking greater penalties." Id. at ¶ 105.
{¶ 15} It is important to note that appellant raisedBlakely as an objection at the trial court level during the sentencing hearing. The trial court overruled the objection, but noted that Foster was pending on review with the Supreme Court. Upon release of Foster, appellant's objection based onBlakely was well-founded. Therefore, we find appellant's second assignment of error well-taken.
{¶ 16} Appellant's first assignment of error concerns only the sentence imposed for the weapons under disability conviction. Appellant asserts that following a well-founded objection, the trial court improperly re-sentenced appellant to additional time than that previously imposed. Due to the fact that appellant's sentences in all three cases must be vacated and remanded for re-sentencing, we find appellant's first assignment of error moot following the disposition of the second assignment of error.
{¶ 17} Appellant's first assignment of error is therefore not well taken.
{¶ 18} In light of Foster, the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is reversed. This case is remanded for proceedings to resentence appellant in all three underlying cases consistent with this opinion pursuant to Foster.
O'Neill, J., concurs, O'Toole, J., concurs in judgment only.
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