In Re Estate of Tyus, 2006ca00348 (10-29-2007)
In Re Estate of Tyus, 2006ca00348 (10-29-2007)
Opinion of the Court
{¶ 2} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ENTERING AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER DENYING THE ADMISSION OF THE WILL OF WILLIAM TYUS PURSUANT TO O.R. SEC.
{¶ 3} "II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN SETTING A HEARING ON THE ADMISSION OF THE WILL OF WILLIAM TYUS AND THEN WRONGFULLY ACTED AS THE TRIER OF FACT AND DETERMINED THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES TO BASE ITS DECISION TO DISALLOW THE ADMISSION OF THE WILL.
{¶ 4} "III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN APPLYING THE STANDARD TO ESTABLISH FOR THE ADMISSION OF THE WILL AS CLEAR AND CONVINCING INSTEAD OF THE CORRECT STANDARD WHICH IS A PRIMA FACIE CASE AS ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE THEN THE WILL COMPORTS TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF R.C. SEC.
{¶ 5} The decedent died on August 6, 2006, at age 63. On October 3, 2006, appellant offered a one page document for probate. The document is headed "To Whom It May Concern", and it begins "I, William Thorton Tyus, hereby give all my earthy [sic] goods to Constance [sic] King (known as Connie)". The document lists *Page 3 decedent's three vehicles, all his televisions, an air conditioner, an air compressor PSI 75 Series 375 pounds, his savings at United Bank and any other bank, all tools, spray gun (the works), cherry picker and anything else that belongs to or has decedent's name on it. The document also states "let it be known, that anything that Connie doesn't want, she will give to my daughter, Regina Marie Frank." The document closes with the words "I, William Thorton Tyus, being in sound mind date this letter on June 11, 2002." The document was notarized on August 15, 2002, stating William T. Tyus, Grantor, and Mary Lovee Cox, witness, signed the document in the notary's presence, being of legal age and sound mind, and signing of their own free will.
{¶ 7} The first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 9} Appellant argues the trial court erred as a matter of law pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 10} In addition, the document must demonstrate a testamentary intent, that is, a disposition of property to take effect only on the testator's death, see, e.g., In Re: Estate of Ike, Deceased (1982),
{¶ 11} Appellee asserts this document cannot be considered a will, because nowhere on the document does it indicate it is effective upon the death of the testator.
{¶ 12} We do not agree. The document refers to all decedent's earth[l] y good" and states decedent is "in sound mind". These are phrases commonly associated with wills. The document purports to dispose of all the decedent's property, and mentions decedent's daughter. The document cannot be construed as an intervivos gift: if the decedent understood what he was signing, he was giving away all he possessed. We conclude the document indicates testamentary intent.
{¶ 13} Appellee argues to qualify as a will, the document must be revocable, and the document does not state it is revocable. Appellee cites First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Oppenheimer (1963),
{¶ 14} The trial court's judgment entry of November 8 found appellant had failed to meet the requisite burden of proof. In determining whether a document meets the statutory requirements to be construed as a will the trial court applies a preponderance of the evidence standard, seeIn re: Young (1978),
{¶ 15} A hearing conducted pursuant to R.C.2107.081 is not an adversarial proceeding, see In Re: Estate of Smith (1997),
{¶ 16} The trial court approved an amended statement of the record pursuant to App. R. 9, (C) in the absence of a transcript. The court found the witness to the document, Ms. Cox, testified she first wrote by hand what decedent wanted to be put down on paper regarding the distribution of his assets, and then typed it up. She testified the document represented decedent's wishes as to the distribution of his assets when he passed away, and she verified her signature on the document. *Page 6
{¶ 17} Ms. Cox testified decedent took her to the notary's home, where decedent presented the document as his last will. The witness testified she believed decedent knew what he was doing and was mentally competent although physically ill.
{¶ 18} The notary testified he placed the notary clause on the document, and then he, decedent, and Ms. Cox signed the document together. The notary testified he believed decedent knew what he was doing and understood what he was signing.
{¶ 19} We have reviewed the record, and we find appellant properly set forth a prima facie case for the document to be considered a will. We find the trial court should have determined the document is a will and should have admitted it to probate.
{¶ 20} The second and third assignments of error are sustained.
{¶ 21} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, of Stark County, Ohio, is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court for further proceedings in accord with law and consistent with this opinion.
*Page 7Gwin, P.J., Hoffman, J., and Farmer, J., concur
Reference
- Full Case Name
- In Re: The Estate of William T. Tyus.
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published