In Re D.R., Unpublished Decision (11-1-2007)
In Re D.R., Unpublished Decision (11-1-2007)
Opinion of the Court
{¶ 2} The following facts give rise to this appeal. In April 2004, D.R.'s mother began receiving services through the Agency's START Unit, which serves women who have tested positive for drugs during pregnancy. The mother tested positive for crack cocaine twice during her pregnancy with D.R. D.R. was born on July 29, 2004, with a third kidney.
{¶ 3} On April 20, 2005, CCDCFS arranged for the mother to enter Miracle Village, a drug treatment facility that permits its patients to maintain custody of their children. While in treatment, the mother was found to be using crack cocaine. She was required to start over if she wanted to remain in the program. She elected to leave. On July 14, 2005, the mother left D.R. with her maternal grandmother and disappeared. Because D.R.'s maternal grandmother had an open case with the Agency, the child was removed on July 15, 2005.
{¶ 4} The child could not be placed with Appellant because he was residing in a home where drug activity and prostitution were known to occur. Appellant acknowledged this and stipulated to an order of predispositional temporary custody. *Page 4 D.R. was ordered into the temporary custody of CCDCFS and placed in a foster home.
{¶ 5} Again, in January 2006, the trial court adjudged D.R. to be a dependent child and entered a disposition of temporary custody to CCDCFS. On September 21, 2006, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody.
{¶ 6} A trial was held on February 22, 2007. The child's mother stipulated to the termination of her parental rights and an award of permanent custody to CCDCFS. Appellant stipulated to a finding that D.R. had been in the Agency's custody for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period and requested that the court proceed directly to the best interest determination. A trial the evidence revealed that Appellant tested positive for cocaine in October 2006. The case plan was amended to include substance abuse assessment and treatment. Appellant refused to enter treatment and continued to test positive for cocaine. He consistently denied his drug use, explaining that the positive test results were caused by his recent sexual contact with the mother and by taking Tylenol and buying crack cocaine for the mother.
{¶ 7} Appellant failed to complete his anger management classes as required by the case plan. He did receive a certificate for completing a domestic violence program, but was subsequently arrested for assaulting the mother. Appellant did not make any further progress toward satisfying the case plan objectives relating to drug *Page 5 abuse, housing, domestic violence, or anger management. In addition, he was not employed.
{¶ 8} After hearing all the evidence, the trial court determined that it was in the best interest of the child to award permanent custody to CCDCFS. Appellant appeals, advancing one assignment of error for our review. His sole assignment of error states the following:
{¶ 9} "The trial court erred in granting Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services' motion for permanent custody as such decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice."
{¶ 10} A claim that the court's finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence requires us to examine the evidence and determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way. In re: M.W., Cuyahoga App. No. 83390,
{¶ 11} In order to terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to a county agency, the record must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one of the conditions set forth in R.C.
{¶ 12} Appellant argues that CCDCFS failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant would not be able to parent his child within a reasonable time, or that Appellant failed to remedy the condition that caused D.R. to be removed from the home. Appellant also argues that CCDCFS failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child. Finally, Appellant argues that it was not in the best interest of the child to grant CCDCFS's motion for permanent custody.
{¶ 13} In the instant case, Appellant stipulated to a finding under R.C.
{¶ 14} When determining the best interest of the child, the court is required to consider all relevant factors listed in R.C.
"(1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; "(2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard to the maturity of the child; "(3) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999; "(4) The child's need for a legally secure placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency; "(5) Whether any of the factors in division (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child."
{¶ 15} This court has found that only one of the enumerated factors needs to be resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody. In reMoore (Aug. 31, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76942, citing, In re ShaefferChildren (1993),
{¶ 16} We find that the trial court considered all relevant factors and properly determined that permanent custody was in the child's best interest.
{¶ 17} Finally, the trial court was not required to establish that CCDCFS made reasonable efforts to prevent the child's removal from the home because the hearing was based on a motion for permanent custody filed pursuant to R.C.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ANTHONY O. CALABRESE, JR., J., and KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR.
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