State v. Wolford, 06ca14 (2-15-2008)
State v. Wolford, 06ca14 (2-15-2008)
Opinion of the Court
{¶ 4} However, the trooper stated that he actually observed Wolford for 21 minutes before the test, instead of 19 minutes. He said that the 1:34 a.m. time came from the computer ("CAD") time the dispatcher used at the office, which time is synchronized with his car's computer. However, the 1:53 a.m. time came from the breath testing machine. He said that he noticed the discrepancy right after the test. He then compared the machine and CAD times and found that the machine time was two minutes slower.
{¶ 9} Wolford appeals and asserts one assignment of error. He contends that the trial court erred when it overruled his motion to suppress.
{¶ 11} "The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony." Seasons Coal Co. v.Cleveland (1984),
{¶ 12} Here, the trial court made factual findings that the trooper observed Wolford for 20 minutes before the breath test and that he did not ingest anything during that time. Accordingly, we must uphold the trial court's findings of fact if the record contains competent, credible evidence to support the factual findings.
{¶ 13} Wolford contends that the trial court erred when it overruled his motion to suppress the results of his breath test because the trooper did not observe him for 20 minutes, as required by law. The state concedes that the paperwork shows that the trooper only observed Wolford for 19 minutes but claims that the trooper actually observed Wolford for 21 minutes. The state asserts the trooper *Page 5 used two different clocks for the starting and ending times and the ending clock was two minutes slower than the starting clock.
{¶ 14} On a pretrial motion to suppress breath test results, the state has the burden of proving that the test was conducted in accordance with law. Reynoldsburg v. Hamad (Feb. 18, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP545. The trial court should admit the test results into evidence if the state can demonstrate "substantial compliance" with the applicable regulations. State v. Plummer (1986),
{¶ 15} The issue that we must address is Wolford's assertion that he ingested mints during the 20-minute period. This evidence was introduced only during the bench trial and was not introduced at the suppression hearing or considered by the trial court in deciding the motion to suppress. Wolford states, "a trial court's limited consideration of evidence adduced in a bench trial, subsequent to denial of a defendant's motion to suppress evidence, requires a court of appeals to determine whether the trial evidence required a contrary ruling."
{¶ 16} Here, the trial court heard two versions of what occurred. The state's version was that the trooper observed Wolford for over 20 minutes and that he did not ingest anything. Wolford's version was that the trooper observed him for less than 20 minutes, and he ingested mints during the time in question. The state maintains that the trooper's testimony supports its version. Wolford claims *Page 6 that the paperwork supports his version concerning the length of the trooper's observation, and that his trial testimony supports his mint ingestion claim.
{¶ 17} The trial court, as the trier of fact, chose to believe the state's version. Competent, credible evidence supports the trial court's finding. That is, the trooper testified that he observed Wolford for 21 minutes; he did not ingest anything, including cinnamon mints; and that he handcuffed Wolford's hands in back of him, not the front. As we stated earlier, "the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony."Seasons Coal Co., supra, at 80. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err when it overruled Wolford's motion to suppress.
{¶ 18} Accordingly, we overrule Wolford's sole assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
*Page 7JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Jackson County Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.
If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is continued for a period of sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of said stay is to allow appellant to file with the Ohio Supreme Court an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. The stay as herein continued will terminate in any event at the expiration of the sixty day period.
The stay shall terminate earlier if the appellant fails to file a notice of appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec.2 of the Rules of Practice of the Ohio Supreme Court. Additionally, if the Ohio Supreme Court dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of said sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 for the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Harsha, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only.
*Page 1McFarland, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
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