State v. Knepper
State v. Knepper
Opinion of the Court
INTRODUCTION
{¶ 1} Heather Knepper pleaded guilty to theft of drugs, illegal processing of drug documents, and aggravated possession of drugs for stealing morphine from
POSITION OF TRUST
{¶ 2} Under R.C. 2951.041(A)(1), “[i]f an offender is charged with a criminal offense and the court has reason to believe that drug or alcohol usage by the offender was a factor leading to the offender’s criminal behavior, the court may accept, prior to the entry of a guilty plea, the offender’s request for intervention in lieu of conviction.” To be eligible for intervention in lieu of conviction, the court must find that the offender’s situation meets nine requirements. R.C. 2951.041(B)(1) through (9). One of the requirements is that “[t]he offender * * * is charged with a felony for which the court, upon conviction, would impose sentence under division (B)(2)(b) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code * * *.” R.C. 2951.041(B)(1). R.C. 2929.13(B)(2)(b) sets forth the conditions under which a sentencing court can impose community control. One of the conditions is that the court has not found that any of the circumstances listed in R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) through (i) apply. One of those circumstances, which would prevent the court from imposing community control, is that “[t]he offender held a public office or position of trust and the offense related to that office or position * * R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d).
{¶ 3} The state has argued that nurses with access to narcotic drugs occupy a position of trust and, therefore, are ineligible for intervention in lieu of conviction under R.C. 2951.041(A). This court recently considered the same issue in Massien, 2009-Ohio-1521, 2009 WL 826410, ¶ 4. A majority of the judges in that case concluded that the state’s assignment of error should be overruled because “the legislature intended for nurses and other licensed medical professionals to be eligible for [intervention in lieu of conviction].” Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶ 4} The state has asked this court to overrule Massien. Indeed, a majority of the judges on this panel believe that it reached the wrong conclusion. In In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205, 2006-Ohio-5484, 855 N.E.2d 851, the Supreme Court issued a directive that “[a]ppellate courts are duty-bound to resolve conflicts within their respective appellate districts through en banc proceedings.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. It has also written that until a procedural rule is
CONCLUSION
{¶ 5} The trial court correctly concluded that Knepper was eligible for intervention in lieu of conviction because, even though she works as a nurse at a hospital, she does not occupy a position of trust as that term is used in R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d). The judgment of the Summit County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Concurring Opinion
concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 6} While I am persuaded by the reasoning expressed by Judge Carr in her dissent in State v. Massien, 9th Dist. No. 24369, 2009-Ohio-1521, 2009 WL 826410, and convinced that the plain language of R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(d) compels us to reverse the trial court, on the basis of stare decisis, I concur in the judgment of the court.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 7} I respectfully dissent for the reasons I articulated in State v. Massien, 9th Dist. No. 24369, 2009-Ohio-1521, 2009 WL 826410 (Carr, J., dissenting).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- The STATE of Ohio v. KNEPPER
- Cited By
- 5 cases
- Status
- Published