[Cite as State v. Hartley,

.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT UNION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 14-09-42

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

KEITH HARTLEY, OPINION

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 08-CR-0071

Appeal Dismissed

Date of Decision: May 10, 2010

APPEARANCES:

Alison Boggs, for Appellant

Terry L. Hord, for Appellee Case No. 14-09-42

ROGERS, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Keith A. Hartley, appeals the judgment of the

Court of Common Pleas of Union County convicting him of two counts each of

receiving stolen property and tampering with evidence, and ordering him to serve

an aggregate nine-year and ten-month prison term. On appeal, Hartley argues that

his trial counsel was ineffective and that the trial court erred in ordering him to

serve consecutive prison terms.

{¶2} Before we can reach the merits of Hartley’s assignments of error, we

must first determine whether jurisdiction exists to hear this appeal.

{¶3} Appellate jurisdiction is limited to review of lower courts’ final

judgments. Section 3(B)(2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. To be a final

appealable order, a judgment entry must meet the requirements of R.C. 2505.02

and, if applicable, Crim.R. 32(C). Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ. (1989),

; State v. Teague, 3d Dist. No. 9-01-25,

.

Additionally, the issue of whether a judgment is a final appealable order is a

jurisdictional question, which an appellate court may raise sua sponte. Chef

Italiano Corp.,

.

{¶4} R.C. 2505.02(B) discusses final orders and provides, in pertinent

part:

(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:

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(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;

As R.C. 2505.02(B) requires a final order to “determine the action” and “prevent a

judgment,” “‘[a] judgment that leaves issues unresolved and contemplates that

further action must be taken is not a final appealable order.’” State ex rel. Keith v.

McMonagle,

,

, ¶4, quoting Bell v. Horton,

,

. Further, “‘[f]or an order to

determine the action and prevent a judgment for the party appealing, it must

dispose of the whole merits of the cause or some separate and distinct branch

thereof and leave nothing for determination of the court.’” State ex rel. Bd. of

State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Davis,

, 2007-Ohio-

2205, ¶45, quoting State ex rel. Downs v. Panioto,

, 2006-

Ohio-8, ¶20.

{¶5} Here, the trial court’s November 2009 judgment entry ordered

Hartley to pay “restitution to the victims herein in the total amount of $32,275.57

which was the amount agreed to by the Defendant and the State of Ohio. Said

restitution amount shall be paid through the Union County Clerk of Court’s

Office” (Emphasis added) (Nov. 2009 Judgment Entry, pp. 1-2). However, the

November 2009 Judgment Entry did not list any victims, did not describe how the

restitution would be allocated among the victims, and did not incorporate any

document providing this information. Accordingly, we find that the judgment

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entry appealed from left unresolved issues and contemplated further action. As

such, the judgment entry was not a final appealable order, and this Court is

without jurisdiction to determine this appeal. Cf. State v. Kuhn, 3d Dist. No. 4-05-

23,

(finding that judgment entry failing to set forth a specific

amount of restitution or method of payment was not a final appealable order).

{¶6} Accordingly, we must dismiss Hartley’s appeal for lack of

jurisdiction.

Appeal Dismissed

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J., and SHAW, J., concur.

/jnc

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