In re A.W.

; In re D.S., 5th Dist. Licking No. 13-

CA-58.

2014-Ohio-867

. As noted previously by this Court, Raber is factually and

procedurally distinguishable from the case at hand.

Raber was classified pursuant

to R.C. 2950.01(B)(2) as an adult sexual offender. The same statute is not applicable to Knox County, Case No. 15CA3 6

appellant, a juvenile offender. Rather, in this case, the court’s ability to classify A.W.

arose from the clause of R.C. 2152.83 granting the court jurisdiction to issue an order

classifying A.W. as part of the dispositional order. Here, A.W. had not attained the age

of twenty-one at the time of the classification and was therefore still subject to the

jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

{¶15} As we noted in D.R., “the classification process [is] not a new proceeding

but rather a continuation of the original delinquency case” and thus “multiple

punishments have not been imposed.” 5th Dist. Knox No. 13CA27,

Further, in D.S., we stated that “whether appellant was ‘subject to registration’ was an

issue properly to be determined during the trial court’s hearing on

registration/classification. It was not an issue that needed to be determined at his

original disposition because of his commitment to a secure facility.” 5th Dist. Licking

No. 13-CA-58.

2014-Ohio-867

{¶16} In this case, appellant was committed to ODYS for a period of one year or

until his twenty-first birthday on the offense of rape. The trial court, “continued

disposition as to sexual offender registration requirements until [A.W.'s] first parole

hearing following his release form [sic] the Department of Youth Services. [A.W.]

should have no expectation that he will not be given a registration requirement." In

accordance with our holdings in D.R. and D.S., appellant’s first assignment of error is

overruled.

II.

{¶17} Appellant next contends that the imposition of a classification period

extending beyond his twenty-first birthday and the age jurisdiction of the juvenile court Knox County, Case No. 15CA3 7

violates his right to due process and is cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant

emphasizes that the purpose of the juvenile system is supposed to be rehabilitation

rather than punishment, pointing out that the registration scheme is now considered

punitive.

{¶18} With regards to due process, this Court has previously found that

registration requirements extending past the child’s twenty-first birthday does not violate

a child’s due process rights. In re D.R., 5th Dist. Knox No. 13CA27,

; In

re D.S., 5th Dist. Licking No. 13-CA-58.

2014-Ohio-867

. As we previously noted in

these cases, the registration requirements in R.C. 2152.83 bear a rational relationship

to the legitimate goal of rehabilitation.

In accordance with our holdings in these

cases, we overrule appellant’s argument with regard to due process.

{¶19} In D.R., this Court stated that though the imposition of R.C. 2152.83

registration requirements “may be punitive, they may help achieve the goal of

rehabilitation by motivating the juvenile to comply with treatment in order to reduce or

eliminate the registration requirement.” 5th Dist. Knox No. 13CA27,

Additionally, as noted by the Seventh District, “we cannot conclude that the mere fact

that registration may be required past age twenty-one would make a scheme cruel and

unusual or shocking to a sense of justice.” In re M.R., 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 13 JE 30,

. While there is mandatory classification for sixteen and seventeen

year olds such as appellant, there is no automatic tier placement based upon the

offense as the juvenile court has discretion on the choice of tier after the juvenile has

been provided with an evidentiary hearing.

Further, the tier placement can be Knox County, Case No. 15CA3 8

appealed by the juvenile, the juvenile can, after three years of disposition, file a petition

seeking declassification or reclassification, and another petition later. R.C. 2152.85;

{¶20} As in D.R. and M.R., there is no community notification involved here, the

juvenile judge has a role in determining how dangerous the juvenile might be or what

level of registration would be adequate to preserve the safety of the public, and the

classification can be eliminated or modified three years after final disposition. 5th Dist.

Knox No. 13CA27,

; 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 13 JE 30,

Accordingly, “the mere fact that the classification can extend beyond age twenty-one is

not cruel and unusual, nor does it shock the conscience or raise concerns with a

fundamental fairness.” In re M.R., 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 13 JE 30,

;

see also In re J.O., 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 25903,

2014-Ohio-2813

(holding that a

juvenile court imposing a registration requirement that extends beyond the age of

twenty-one is not cruel and unusual punishment).

{¶21} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶22} Appellant argues R.C. 2152.83(A) violates the equal protection clauses of

the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions because sixteen and seventeen year olds are required

to register solely based on their age, while children thirteen years or younger at the time

of the offense are not subject to sexual offender registrant classification, and the

juvenile court has discretion to classify children who are fourteen and fifteen at the time

of the offense. Appellant contends this age-based classification is not rationally related

to the State’s objective in making the classification. Knox County, Case No. 15CA3 9

{¶23} To determine the constitutionality of a statue under the equal protection

clause, we must first determine whether a fundamental right or suspect class is

involved. Conley v. Shearer,

64 Ohio St.3d 284

595 N.E.2d 862

(1992). “A statutory

classification which involves neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right does not

violate the Equal Protection Clause * * * if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate

government interest.” McCrone v. Bank One Corp.,

107 Ohio St.3d 272

, 2005-Ohio-

6505,

839 N.E.2d 1

. Suspect classes include race, sex, religion, and national origin;

age is excluded and is not a suspect class. Adamsky v. Buckeye Local School Dist.,

73 Ohio St. 360

653 N.E.2d 212

(1995).

{¶24} Where the challenger does not raise a suspect classification or a

fundamental right, the test provides that classifications among individuals are

permissible and the statute upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate purpose, even

if the classifications are not precise. State v. Thompkins,

75 Ohio St.3d 558

664 N.E.2d 926

(1996); Groch v. General Motors,

117 Ohio St.3d 192

2008-Ohio-546

883 N.E.2d 377

. Under a rational basis review, the judgment of the General Assembly is

granted substantial deference. State v. Williams,

88 Ohio St.3d 513

728 N.E.2d 342

(2000).

{¶25} In D.R., we found that though the imposition of R.C. 2152.83 registration

requirements may be punitive, they “may help achieve the goal of rehabilitation by

motivating the juvenile court to comply with treatment in order to reduce or eliminate the

registration requirement.” 5th Dist. Knox No. 13CA27,

{¶26} Further, other districts considering equal protection arguments have found

that the age classification scheme in R.C. 2152.83 bears a rational relationship to a Knox County, Case No. 15CA3 10

legitimate government interest and does not violate a juvenile’s right to equal protection

of the law. The Eleventh District found in In re B.D. that the legislature made a policy

decision to exclude those thirteen and under from the classification scheme, found this

decision is a uniquely legislative function, and that the legislature’s decision was not

unreasonable. 11th Dist. Portage No. 2011-P-0078,

2012-Ohio-4463

{¶27} The Seventh District found that the drawing of the line so that fourteen and

fifteen year old sex offenders are only subject to discretionary classification rather than

the mandatory classification (into a discretionary tier) that sixteen and seventeen year

olds are subject to has some rational basis to a legitimate government interest. In re

M.R., 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 13 JE 30,

. Since the purpose of the sex

offender registration is ultimately to protect the public (R.C. 2950.02), as a juvenile

matures, he becomes more responsible and thus more accountability can be expected.

The court found that, “it is not irrational for legislators to conclude that the farther a

juvenile is from adulthood, the more responsive he will be to treatment. From this, the

legislature could reason that the lower age of the offender, the reduced likelihood of

recidivism and thus the decreased need for tracking.”

{¶28} The Third District similarly found that the age classification scheme in R.C.

2152.83 bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest and does not

violate the appellant’s right to equal protection of the law. In the Matter of J.M., 3rd Dist.

Wyandot No. 16-12-01,

2012-Ohio-4109

. The court found that if the purpose of the

sexual offender classification registration is to “protect the public due to the likelihood of

recidivism among sex offenders, the General Assembly concluded that the lower the

age of the offender, the reduced likelihood of recidivism, thereby granting the juvenile Knox County, Case No. 15CA3 11

court discretion in determining whether a sex offender classification is needed when the

offender is younger.”