[Cite as Gen. Elec. Credit Union v. Meadows,

.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

GENERAL ELECTRIC CREDIT : APPEAL NO. C-150230 UNION, f.k.a. GENERAL ELECTRIC TRIAL NO. A-1308506 EVENDALE EMPLOYEES FEDERAL : CREDIT UNION, : O P I N I O N. Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. : SHARON K. MEADOWS, : Defendant-Appellant. : and, : ESTATE OF MIRIAM MEDOW, et al., Defendants. :

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Appeal Dismissed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 30, 2015

Statman, Harris, & Eyrich, LLC, and William B. Fecher, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Montgomery, Rennie & Johnson, LPA, Elaine M. Stoll and Ralph E. Burnham, for Defendant-Appellant.

Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

S TAUTBERG , Judge.

{¶1} This appeal arises from a summary-judgment order issued in a foreclosure

action. Defendant-appellant Sharon K. Meadows and plaintiff-appellee General Electric

Credit Union (“G.E.”) moved the trial court for summary judgment on the issue of

whether Meadows’s dower interest in the subject property or G.E.’s mortgage lien had

priority in the underlying foreclosure action. The trial court determined that G.E.’s

mortgage lien had priority. It therefore overruled Meadows’s motion and granted G.E.’s.

Meadows now appeals that order. At the time of Meadows’s appeal, the foreclosure

action was still pending in the trial court. Before reaching the merits of Meadows’s

appeal, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction in this matter.

{¶2} This court has “such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and

affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the

court of appeals within the district * * * .” Article IV, Section 3(B)(2), Ohio Constitution.

Where, as here, we are faced with an appeal from an order that does not dispose of all

claims against all of the parties, we must (1) determine whether the order is “final”

within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02, and, if it is, we must (2) determine whether the

requirements of Civ.R. 54(B) have been met. Sullivan v. Anderson Twp.,

,

,

; Walburn v. Dunlap,

,

,

; Denham v. New Carlisle,

,

(1999); Noble v. Colwell,

,

(1989); compare Welsh Dev. Co. v. Warren Cty. Regional Planning Comm.,

,

,

, ¶ 14 (holding that when the right to appeal

is conferred by statute, an appeal can be perfected only in the manner prescribed by the

applicable statute.)

2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Finality Under R.C. 2505.02

{¶3} In Queen City S. & L. Co. v. Foley,

,

(1960), the Supreme Court held that “[i]n a mortgage foreclosure action, a journalized

order determining that the mortgage constitutes the first and best lien upon the subject

real estate is a judgment or final order from which an appeal may be perfected.”

at

syllabus (emphasis added). While at first glance this holding appears to control the

jurisdictional issue in this case, Queen City addressed only the matter of finality under

R.C. 2505.02. Civ.R. 54(B) certification was not at issue in that case. Further, Queen

City was decided prior to the series of cases, cited above, that require us to consider

whether the requirements of both R.C. 2505.02 and Civ.R. 54(B) have been met to

properly perfect an appeal. We therefore find that Queen City disposes only of the issue

that the order before us is “final” under R.C. 2505.02. See id. at 385-387. We must also

analyze whether the court’s order met the requirements of Civ.R. 54(B). See Sullivan;

Walburn; Denham; Nobel.

Civ.R. 54(B)

{¶4} The general purpose of Civ.R. 54(B) is to balance the policy against

piecemeal appeals with the possible injustice sometimes created by the delay of appeals.

Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co.,

,

(1977).

Civ.R. 54(B) provides:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action * * *, the

court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of

the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no

just reason for delay. In the absence of a determination that there is no

just reason for delay, any order * * * which adjudicates fewer than all the

claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not

3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or

other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry

of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of

all the parties.

{¶5} Thus, the appealability of a final order disposing of fewer than all of the

claims in an action is a determination that must be made by the trial court. See IBEW

Local Union No. 8 v. Vaugh Industries, LLC,

,

,

(holding that a trial court may not bypass the requirement to include the

express language of Civ.R. 54(B) simply by designating an order as final). In deciding

that there is “no just reason for delay,” the trial court makes the determination that an

interlocutory appeal is consistent with the interests of sound judicial administration, i.e.,

that an immediate appeal will lead to judicial economy. Wisintainer v. Elcen Power

Strut Co.,

,

(1993), syllabus. A Civ.R. 54(B)

certification that “there is no just reason for delay” therefore can “transform a final order

into a final appealable order.”

.

No Certification, No Jurisdiction

{¶6} Here, the trial court did not certify its order under Civ.R. 54(B). And all of

the claims as to all of the parties in this case have not yet been determined. We therefore

hold that this appeal has not been perfected, and that we are without jurisdiction in this

matter. In so holding, we overrule Bank of Am., N.A. v. Omega Design/Build Group,

LLC, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100018,

to the extent that it conflicts

with this opinion. Appeal dismissed.

CUNNINGHAM, P.J., and FISCHER, J. ., concur.

4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Please note: The court has recorded its own entry this date.

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