{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jasmine Moore, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that dismissed the claims against her without prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On July 24, 2015, plaintiff-appellee, Richard Lewis, Jr., acting pro se, filed suit against appellant and Alfa Insurance Corporation ("Alfa"). In his complaint, appellee alleged he sustained injuries to his body, as well as damages to his 2007 Lincoln MKZ, as a direct result of a collision caused by appellant. The complaint was served by certified mail on appellant and Alfa at "P.O. BOX 2128[,] Brentwood, TN 37024-2128." (Summons.) The record contains two United States Postal Service notices indicating that "Jeff Alexander" received and signed for the complaint at that address on August 3, 2015. Appellee indicated at the top of his complaint that the "[d]ate of loss" was "12/16/13." (Complaint at 2.)

{¶ 3} On August 18, 2015, Alfa and appellant each filed separate answers. Both answers denied appellee's claims and asserted several defenses. Appellant specifically asserted the defense of "insufficiency of service of process and insufficiency of process" as well as "lack of personal jurisdiction over this answering [d]efendant." (Answer at 2.) Appellant ultimately stated that "having fully answered the Complaint of Plaintiff[ ], prays that same may be dismissed and that she may go hence and recover her costs of suit herein." (Answer at 3.)

{¶ 4} On December 11, 2015, appellant and Alfa jointly filed an initial identification of witnesses. On April 11, 2016, appellant and Alfa jointly filed a notice of deposition of appellee, and, on April 13, 2016, appellant and Alfa jointly filed an amended notice of deposition of appellee. On July 21, 2016, the case was referred to a magistrate to preside over a jury trial scheduled for December 6, 2016.

{¶ 5} On August 5, 2016, appellant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Civ.R. 3, alleging that appellee had failed to commence this action within the time provided by law. Specifically, appellant argued that (1) she has never resided or maintained a post office box in Tennessee, (2) appellee requested service of the complaint of both her and Alfa at Alfa's post office box in Brentwood Tennessee, (3) at the time of the filing of the complaint, she was living in Columbus, Ohio, and (4) she never received any complaint of summons from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas related to this case. Appellant moved for dismissal with prejudice of the complaint for failure to commence the case by serving her within one year from the filing of the complaint.

{¶ 6} On August 18, 2016, appellee, pro se, filed a memorandum contra and conceded that he had served appellant at the address of Alfa. Appellee stated that he was now aware of appellant's address and would serve the complaint on her at that address if permitted to do so. Appellee argued that the clerk was at fault for not informing him that service on appellant had "failed" and that, as a consequence, the rules should be liberally construed to permit appellee to serve appellant. Appellee argued the case should not be dismissed with prejudice. On August 22, 2016, appellant filed a reply memorandum noting that her answer had specifically notified appellee that she had never been served and rejecting appellee's argument that the rules should be liberally construed to permit service.

{¶ 7} On October 19, 2016, the trial court granted appellant's motion to dismiss. The court noted that Civ.R. 3(A) was the rationale for dismissing appellant's claims, but Civ.R. 12(B)(2) served as the vehicle for effectuating the dismissal. The court rejected appellee's argument that the lack of service was the clerk's fault, but, nevertheless, determined that "justice requires this case be dismissed without prejudice so that the plaintiff may have the opportunity to refile his claims if he so chooses." (Decision and Entry at 3.) Appellant timely appealed the trial court's decision and entry.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 8} Appellant assigns the following two assignments of error for our review:

I. The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of Defendant Jasmine Moore when it failed to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice.

II. The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of Defendant when it construed the motion to dismiss as a motion pursuant to Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 12(B)(2) rather than Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 3.

III. Discussion

{¶ 9} " Civ.R. 3(A) states that '[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, if service is obtained within one year from such filing upon a named defendant.' Where service of process is not properly made pursuant to Civ.R. 4 et seq., the court lacks jurisdiction to consider the complaint and any judgment on that complaint is void ab initio."

Shah v. Simpson , 10th Dist. No. 13AP-24, 2014-Ohio-675 , 2014 WL 748498 , ¶ 9, citing Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Boswell , 192 Ohio App.3d 374 , 2011-Ohio-673 , 949 N.E.2d 96 , ¶ 15 (1st Dist.) ; Rite Rug Co., Inc. v. Wilson , 106 Ohio App.3d 59 , 665 N.E.2d 260 (10th Dist. 1995). Our standard of review of a dismissal due to lack of personal jurisdiction is de novo. Id ., citing Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts , 126 Ohio St.3d 81 , 2010-Ohio-2551 , 930 N.E.2d 784 .

{¶ 10} In support of her second assignment of error, which we will address first, appellant argues (1) that failure to commence an action within the time provided by law is not specifically enumerated as a Civ.R. 12(B) defense, and (2) that Civ.R. 3(A) is "in essence, a statute of limitations issue," and therefore it stands on its own under Civ.R. 3(A). (Appellant's Brief at 11.) Therefore, according to appellant, it was error to construe her motion to dismiss as a motion pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(2) rather than pursuant to Civ.R. 3(A). On the facts of this case, we reject both arguments.

{¶ 11} "In order for a court to acquire personal jurisdiction through service of process, a plaintiff must complete adequate service of process upon a defendant within one year from the date the plaintiff files a complaint. Civ.R. 3(A). Lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process are affirmative defenses. Civ.R. 12(B)(2), (4) and (5)." Confidential Servs., Inc. v. Dewey , 10th Dist. No. 98AP-905, 1999 WL 224431 (Apr. 15, 1999). Here, the trial court dismissed the case pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(2), "lack of jurisdiction over the person." 1

{¶ 12} On numerous occasions, this court has affirmed a trial court's dismissal, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(2), (4) or (5), for failure to perfect service within the one-year period set forth in Civ.R. 3(A). See Craig v. Reynolds , 10th Dist. No. 14AP-125, 2014-Ohio-3254 , 2014 WL 3731441 ; Shah ; Sheets v. Sasfy , 10th Dist. No. 98AP-539, 1999 WL 35382 (Jan. 26, 1999) ; Coke v. Mayo , 10th Dist. No. 98AP-550, 1999 WL 52893 (Feb. 4, 1999) ; In re Moore , 14 Ohio App.3d 264 , 470 N.E.2d 916 (10th Dist. 1984), syllabus. Therefore, we disagree with appellant that the defense asserted in appellant's motion to dismiss is not a Civ.R. 12(B) defense.

{¶ 13} In addition, although appellant argues that Civ.R. 3(A) is a statute of limitations issue, she did not assert a statute of limitations defense below, or in her appellate brief before us, or what statute of limitations would apply to appellee's claim. 2 Therefore, on the facts of this case, we disagree with appellant that the trial court should have construed Civ.R. 3(A) in the context of a statute of limitations defense. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's second assignment of error.

{¶ 14} In her first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred by not dismissing appellee's complaint "with prejudice." In support, appellant points to Saunders v. Choi , 12 Ohio St.3d 247 , 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984), and Schafer v. Sunsports Surf Co., Inc. , 10th Dist. No. 06AP-370, 2006-Ohio-6002 , 2006 WL 3291160 . Saunders and Schafer , however, differ from the case before us. In both those cases, the plaintiff's complaint had previously been dismissed once before, 3 and the court determined it was proper to dismiss with prejudice the refiled complaint. Here, the complaint had not been previously dismissed. The complaint had not been refiled. Consequently, we do not find Saunders or Schafer to be dispositive.

{¶ 15} Civ.R. 41(B)(4) states:

Failure other than on the merits . A dismissal for either of the following reasons shall operate as a failure otherwise than on the merits:

(a) lack of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter.

{¶ 16} Pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(4), a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction operates as an adjudication "otherwise than on the merits." A dismissal with prejudice is treated as an adjudication on the merits. Tower City Properties v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision , 49 Ohio St.3d 67 , 69, 551 N.E.2d 122 (1990). A dismissal without prejudice is an adjudication otherwise than on the merits. Thomas v. Freeman , 79 Ohio St.3d 221 , 225, 680 N.E.2d 997 (1997), fn. 2. Therefore, here, where the trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(2), 4 for lack of jurisdiction over the person, the court did not err in dismissing the case without prejudice.

{¶ 17} This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court of Ohio's holding in Thomas . In Thomas , the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's dismissal, without prejudice, pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(4) and 4(E), of a complaint where the plaintiff had failed to perfect service. The court held:

Having determined that where a defendant has not been served, a court does not have jurisdiction over the defendant, we find, in applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius , that such a dismissal would be otherwise than on the merits pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(4) to the exclusion of Civ.R. 41(B)(3) (adjudication on the merits) despite the fact that a trial court's entry may be silent on the issue. This is because Civ.R. 41(B)(4) provides an exception to the general rule that an entry dismissing a case pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B) that does not indicate otherwise is an adjudication on the merits. Civ.R. 41(B)(3). In other words, where a case is dismissed because the court did not have jurisdiction, such as in this case where service has not been perfected, the dismissal is always otherwise than on the merits. Therefore, Civ.R. 41(B)(4) is the controlling subsection.

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at 225, 680 N.E.2d 997 . Although Thomas addressed dismissal on grounds of Civ.R. 41(B)(4) and 4(E), 5 whereas in the instant case the dismissal was on grounds of Civ.R. 12(B)(2) and 3(A), we find the same rationale applies here.

{¶ 18} On the facts of this case, where this is an original complaint and where appellant did not argue a specific statute of limitations applicable to appellee's claims, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint without prejudice. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first assignment of error.

{¶ 19} Finally, we note that appellee has asserted that the savings statute at R.C. 2305.19 6 permits him to refile this case. We decline to address this issue, but note the Supreme Court has indicated that when a court dismissed a case for lack of service under Civ.R. 41(B)(4), the plaintiff may utilize the savings statute to refile within one year, "providing all other procedural requirements of the savings statute have been met." Thomas at paragraph two of the syllabus. The parties did not address the procedural requirements of the savings statute here or below. 7 Furthermore, neither the parties nor the trial court has addressed whether the action was "attempted to be commenced" as required. See La Barbera v. Batsch , 10 Ohio St.2d 106 , 112, 227 N.E.2d 55 (1967) ("before an action may be recommenced under Section 2305.19, Revised Code, it must first have been commenced or attempted to be commenced , within the meaning of [R.C.] 2305.17"). (Emphasis added.) Therefore, at this time, we will not consider the same.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 20} Having overruled appellant's two assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgment affirmed .

SADLER and HORTON, JJ., concur.