Dixon v. Anderson
Dixon v. Anderson
Opinion
[Cite as Dixon v. Anderson,
2018-Ohio-2312.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
KRISTIN DIXON, : APPEAL NO. C-170418 TRIAL NO. 17CV-12430 Plaintiff, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
TIFFANY ANDERSON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 15, 2018
Legal Aid Society of Greater Cincinnati, Amanda Toole and Ashley Richardson Butler, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
DETERS, Judge.
{¶1} In this eviction action, defendant-appellant Tiffany Anderson appeals
from the judgment of the Hamilton County Municipal Court issuing a writ of
restitution of the leased premises in favor of the landlord, plaintiff Kristin Dixon. We
determine that the trial court erred in issuing the writ of restitution, because
Anderson had voluntarily vacated the leased premises prior to the issuance of the
trial court’s writ, and therefore Dixon’s forcible-entry-and-detainer claim was moot.
{¶2} Dixon filed this eviction action against Anderson in June 2017. The
complaint alleged a forcible-entry-and-detainer claim, as well as claims for money
damages. The matter proceeded to trial before a magistrate. Anderson testified that
she planned to vacate the premises by June 30. The magistrate nevertheless
determined that Dixon should be granted a writ of restitution of the property.
Anderson filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. On June 30, the magistrate
issued an order staying her decision contingent upon Anderson paying a bond by
July 5. On July 5, Anderson’s counsel filed a notice of return of possession, stating
that Anderson had vacated the leased premises. Dixon did not file a response. On
July 13, the trial court issued a writ of restitution. Anderson filed a timely appeal.
{¶3} In a single assignment of error, Anderson argues that the trial court
erred in granting Dixon a writ of restitution of the premises.
Civ.R. 54(B) Inapplicable
{¶4} As a jurisdictional matter, we note that although Dixon’s damages
claim remained pending at the time Anderson filed her notice of appeal, the trial
court’s issuance of a writ of restitution is a final, appealable order, despite the
pending claim, because Civ.R. 54(B) is inapplicable in forcible-entry-and-detainer
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
proceedings. See Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Brown, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
120580,
2013-Ohio-4143, ¶ 6, citing Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Jackson,
67 Ohio St.2d 129, 132,
423 N.E.2d 177(1981). Therefore, we have jurisdiction over
Anderson’s appeal. See Brown at ¶ 6.
Forcible-Entry-and-Detainer Claim Was Moot
{¶5} In a forcible-entry-and-detainer action, when a tenant vacates a leased
property, the issue of restitution of the property becomes moot. See Schwab v.
Lattimore,
166 Ohio App.3d 12,
2006-Ohio-1372,
848 N.E.2d 912, ¶ 11(1st Dist.);
Allison v. Braunlin,
113 Ohio App. 511, 512,
179 N.E.2d 79(10th Dist. 1961);
Crossings Dev. Ltd. Partnership v. H.O.T., Inc.,
96 Ohio App.3d 475, 480,
645 N.E.2d 159(9th Dist. 1994). This is because “[f]orcible entry and detainer actions
decide the right to immediate possession of property and nothing else.” Long v.
MacDonald, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-02-10,
2002-Ohio-4693, ¶ 8; see Rithy
Properties, Inc. v. Cheeseman,
2016-Ohio-1602,
63 N.E.3d 752, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.) (“If
immediate possession is no longer at issue because the defendant vacates the
premises and possession is restored to the plaintiff, then continuation of the forcible
entry and detainer action or an appeal of such an action is unnecessary, as there is no
further relief that may be granted.”).
{¶6} In a case similar to the one at bar, the Second Appellate District
reversed and vacated a trial court’s judgment ordering a writ of restitution where the
evidence showed that the tenant had vacated the property prior to the trial court
issuing a writ of restitution. See Richmond’s Ent., Inc. v. Anderson, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 26674,
2016-Ohio-609. In Richmond’s Ent., Inc., the tenant had
vacated the leased premises prior to the hearing before the magistrate, but after the
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
complaint had been filed, and the tenant moved to dismiss the forcible-entry-and-
detainer claim as moot. The landlord opposed the motion to dismiss, because the
tenant had returned the keys on the day of trial, thus the magistrate recommended
issuance of the writ. The tenant filed objections and the trial court overruled the
objections and issued the writ. In reversing the trial court’s judgment, the appellate
court determined that “[b]ecause the only issue in a forcible-entry-and-detainer
action is the right to immediate possession of the premises, and [the landlord]
admittedly had obtained possession prior to the hearing, there was nothing for the
magistrate or the trial court to decide with regard to restitution of the premises. The
issue was moot.” Id. at ¶ 7.
{¶7} The record reflects that the writ of restitution in this case was not
issued by the trial court until after Anderson had left the leased property. Although
the magistrate had recommended issuance of a writ, the magistrate had ordered a
stay of her decision until July 5. Anderson vacated the property, and notified the
court of such on July 5. No evidence in the record contradicts these facts. Therefore,
the trial court erred in entering the writ on July 13, because the forcible entry-and-
detainer claim was moot.
Conclusion
{¶8} In conclusion, we sustain Anderson’s assignment of error. We reverse
the trial court’s judgment ordering a writ of restitution, and we remand the matter to
the trial court to dismiss the forcible-entry-and-detainer claim in count 1 of Dixon’s
complaint.
Judgment accordingly.
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
MOCK, P.J., and ZAYAS, J., concur.
Please note: The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
5
Opinion
[Cite as Dixon v. Anderson,
2018-Ohio-2312.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
KRISTIN DIXON, : APPEAL NO. C-170418 TRIAL NO. 17CV-12430 Plaintiff, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
TIFFANY ANDERSON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 15, 2018
Legal Aid Society of Greater Cincinnati, Amanda Toole and Ashley Richardson Butler, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
DETERS, Judge.
{¶1} In this eviction action, defendant-appellant Tiffany Anderson appeals
from the judgment of the Hamilton County Municipal Court issuing a writ of
restitution of the leased premises in favor of the landlord, plaintiff Kristin Dixon. We
determine that the trial court erred in issuing the writ of restitution, because
Anderson had voluntarily vacated the leased premises prior to the issuance of the
trial court’s writ, and therefore Dixon’s forcible-entry-and-detainer claim was moot.
{¶2} Dixon filed this eviction action against Anderson in June 2017. The
complaint alleged a forcible-entry-and-detainer claim, as well as claims for money
damages. The matter proceeded to trial before a magistrate. Anderson testified that
she planned to vacate the premises by June 30. The magistrate nevertheless
determined that Dixon should be granted a writ of restitution of the property.
Anderson filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. On June 30, the magistrate
issued an order staying her decision contingent upon Anderson paying a bond by
July 5. On July 5, Anderson’s counsel filed a notice of return of possession, stating
that Anderson had vacated the leased premises. Dixon did not file a response. On
July 13, the trial court issued a writ of restitution. Anderson filed a timely appeal.
{¶3} In a single assignment of error, Anderson argues that the trial court
erred in granting Dixon a writ of restitution of the premises.
Civ.R. 54(B) Inapplicable
{¶4} As a jurisdictional matter, we note that although Dixon’s damages
claim remained pending at the time Anderson filed her notice of appeal, the trial
court’s issuance of a writ of restitution is a final, appealable order, despite the
pending claim, because Civ.R. 54(B) is inapplicable in forcible-entry-and-detainer
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
proceedings. See Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Brown, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
120580,
2013-Ohio-4143, ¶ 6, citing Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Jackson,
67 Ohio St.2d 129, 132,
423 N.E.2d 177(1981). Therefore, we have jurisdiction over
Anderson’s appeal. See Brown at ¶ 6.
Forcible-Entry-and-Detainer Claim Was Moot
{¶5} In a forcible-entry-and-detainer action, when a tenant vacates a leased
property, the issue of restitution of the property becomes moot. See Schwab v.
Lattimore,
166 Ohio App.3d 12,
2006-Ohio-1372,
848 N.E.2d 912, ¶ 11(1st Dist.);
Allison v. Braunlin,
113 Ohio App. 511, 512,
179 N.E.2d 79(10th Dist. 1961);
Crossings Dev. Ltd. Partnership v. H.O.T., Inc.,
96 Ohio App.3d 475, 480,
645 N.E.2d 159(9th Dist. 1994). This is because “[f]orcible entry and detainer actions
decide the right to immediate possession of property and nothing else.” Long v.
MacDonald, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-02-10,
2002-Ohio-4693, ¶ 8; see Rithy
Properties, Inc. v. Cheeseman,
2016-Ohio-1602,
63 N.E.3d 752, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.) (“If
immediate possession is no longer at issue because the defendant vacates the
premises and possession is restored to the plaintiff, then continuation of the forcible
entry and detainer action or an appeal of such an action is unnecessary, as there is no
further relief that may be granted.”).
{¶6} In a case similar to the one at bar, the Second Appellate District
reversed and vacated a trial court’s judgment ordering a writ of restitution where the
evidence showed that the tenant had vacated the property prior to the trial court
issuing a writ of restitution. See Richmond’s Ent., Inc. v. Anderson, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 26674,
2016-Ohio-609. In Richmond’s Ent., Inc., the tenant had
vacated the leased premises prior to the hearing before the magistrate, but after the
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
complaint had been filed, and the tenant moved to dismiss the forcible-entry-and-
detainer claim as moot. The landlord opposed the motion to dismiss, because the
tenant had returned the keys on the day of trial, thus the magistrate recommended
issuance of the writ. The tenant filed objections and the trial court overruled the
objections and issued the writ. In reversing the trial court’s judgment, the appellate
court determined that “[b]ecause the only issue in a forcible-entry-and-detainer
action is the right to immediate possession of the premises, and [the landlord]
admittedly had obtained possession prior to the hearing, there was nothing for the
magistrate or the trial court to decide with regard to restitution of the premises. The
issue was moot.” Id. at ¶ 7.
{¶7} The record reflects that the writ of restitution in this case was not
issued by the trial court until after Anderson had left the leased property. Although
the magistrate had recommended issuance of a writ, the magistrate had ordered a
stay of her decision until July 5. Anderson vacated the property, and notified the
court of such on July 5. No evidence in the record contradicts these facts. Therefore,
the trial court erred in entering the writ on July 13, because the forcible entry-and-
detainer claim was moot.
Conclusion
{¶8} In conclusion, we sustain Anderson’s assignment of error. We reverse
the trial court’s judgment ordering a writ of restitution, and we remand the matter to
the trial court to dismiss the forcible-entry-and-detainer claim in count 1 of Dixon’s
complaint.
Judgment accordingly.
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
MOCK, P.J., and ZAYAS, J., concur.
Please note: The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
5
Reference
- Cited By
- 5 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- REAL PROPERTY/LANDLORD AND TENANT – FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER: In a forcible-entry-and-detainer action, the trial court erred in issuing a writ of restitution where the tenant had vacated the leased premises prior to issuance of the writ.