[Cite as LVNV Funding, L.L.C. v. Culgan,

.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT CRAWFORD COUNTY

LVNV FUNDING LLC, CASE NO. 3-23-31 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

CLIFFORD CULGAN, OPINION

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Crawford County Municipal Court Trial Court No. CVF2201000

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: December 26, 2023

APPEARANCES:

Clifford Culgan, Appellant

Megan J. Urban for Appellee Case No. 3-23-31

WILLAMOWSKI, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Clifford Culgan (“Culgan”) appeals the judgment

of the Crawford County Municipal Court, alleging that the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee, LVNV Funding, LLC

(“LVNV”). For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On September 6, 2022, LVNV filed a complaint against Culgan.

LVNV alleged that Culgan had a revolving line of credit from Synchrony Bank but

failed to make the required payments on his account. LVNV subsequently acquired

rights to the outstanding obligation and sought a judgment against Culgan in the

amount of $1,381.70 plus interest. On April 14, 2023, LVNV filed a motion for

summary judgment. On May 30, 2023, the trial court granted summary judgment

in favor of LVNV.

{¶3} Culgan filed his notice of appeal pro se on June 23, 2023. On appeal,

he raises the following two assignments of error:

First Assignment of Error

The Municipal Court erred to the prejudice of the appellant’s substantial constitutional and statutory right by granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee by holding the federal statutes do not require notice to the appellant prior to filing a civil action and do not require proof of debt by submission of the original signed contract.

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Second Assignment of Error

The Municipal Court erred to the prejudice of the appellant’s substantial constitutional and statutory rights by granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee by holding the federal statutes do not require the appellee to produce a copy of the original signed contract to establish venue.

First Assignment of Error

{¶4} Culgan argues that the trial court erred in concluding that LVNV did

not have to comply with the notice requirements contained in 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)

prior to filing this action.

Standard of Review

{¶5} Appellate courts review an order granting summary judgment de novo.

James B. Nutter & Co. v. Estate of Neifer, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-16-20, 2016-

Ohio-7641, ¶ 5. Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is to be granted

only when it is clear ‘(1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.’

Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co.,

,

(1978). The party that moved for summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists for trial and that it is,

therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Beair v. Management & Training

Corp., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-21-07,

.

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{¶6} If the moving party carries its initial burden, the burden then shifts to

the non-moving party to demonstrate that a dispute over a genuine issue of material

fact exists for trial. Hall v. Kosei St. Marys Corporation,

,

(3d Dist.). To prevail, the non-moving party must do more than

make mere denials but must identify specific facts that establish its position. Durfor

v. West Mansfield Conservation Club, 3d Dist. No. 8-21-26,

.

A motion for summary judgment must be granted with caution because it is a

procedural device that terminates the litigation. Williams v. ALPLA, Inc., 2017-

Ohio-4217,

(3d Dist.). “The court must thus construe all

evidence and resolve all doubts in favor of the non-moving party * * *.” Webster

v. Shaw,

,

, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.).

Legal Standard

{¶7} Section 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a) of the FDCPA “requires debt collectors to

issue a ‘validation notice,’ either in the initial communication with a consumer or

within five days of that initial communication, that informs the consumer of certain

rights * * *.” Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Lamar,

(6th

Cir. 2007). Importantly, these notice requirements “are triggered by a debt

collector’s ‘initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection

of any debt.’” Hart v. FCI Lender Services, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2015),

quoting 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a). See also Alausa v. Monterey Financial Services, LLC,

E.D. N.Y. No. 22-CV-3814,

(Sept. 19, 2023).

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{¶8} The FDCPA specifies that “[a] communication in the form of a formal

pleading in a civil action shall not be treated as an initial communication for

purposes of * * * [1692g](a).” 15 U.S.C. 1692g(d). Thus, the “validation notice

requirement * * * does not apply to lawsuits.” Goodman v. Board of Managers of

Harborview Condominium, S.D. N.Y. No. 22-CV-1813,

, *7

(Oct. 23, 2023). Hill v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP,

(S.D. Ohio 2008), quoting Beler v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC,

(7th Cir. 2007) (Since passage of 15 U.S.C. 1692g(d), “legal

pleadings no longer need to be preceded or accompanied by verification notices.”).

Legal Analysis

{¶9} Culgan argues that LVNV was required to comply with the debt

validation requirements of 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a) “prior to filing a civil action.”

(Appellant’s Brief, 5). However, he has not identified any contact that LVNV had

with him before it filed this action that could qualify as an initial communication

under 15 U.S.C. 1692g. While LVNV did file a complaint against Culgan, 15

U.S.C. 1692g(d) expressly states that formal pleadings do not constitute an initial

communication that triggers the requirements of 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a). For these

reasons, he has failed to demonstrate that the debt validation requirements were

triggered before this action was filed. See

. Thus, he cannot establish

that LVNV was required to follow these requirements prior to filing its complaint.

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See Chandler v. McClain Dewees, PLLC, W.D. Kentucky No. 3:19-CV-00233-

RGJ,

, *5-6 (Mar. 11, 2020).

{¶10} In conclusion, Culgan has failed to demonstrate that LVNV was

required to follow the notice validation requirements of 15 U.S.C. 1692g in this

case. Thus, even if the failure to comply with these notice validation requirements

could provide grounds to defeat a plaintiff-creditor’s motion for summary judgment,

Culgan has not, with this argument, demonstrated that the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment in favor of LVNV in this case. Accordingly, his first

assignment of error is overruled.

Second Assignment of Error

{¶11} Culgan argues that LVNV failed to establish that the venue for this

action was proper under the federal standards set forth in 15 U.S.C. 1692i.

Legal Standard

{¶12} “Venue * * * relates to the geographic division where a cause can be

tried * * *.” Morrison v. Steiner,

,

(1972).

Ohio Civ.R. 3(C) contains a list of venues that can provide a proper forum for an

action. This list includes “[t]he county in which the defendant resides[.]” Civ.R.

3(C)(1). See State ex rel. Yeaples v. Gall,

,

,

. Further, 15 U.S.C. 1692i also addresses the issue of venue in

legal actions by debt collectors and reads as follows:

(a) Venue

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Any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt against any consumer shall—

(1) in the case of an action to enforce an interest in real property securing the consumer’s obligation, bring such action only in a judicial district or similar legal entity in which such real property is located; or

(2) in the case of an action not described in paragraph (1), bring such action only in the judicial district or similar legal entity—

(A) in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or

(B) in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the action.

(Emphasis added.) 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a). Thus, unless the consumer’s obligation is

secured by an interest in real property, venue is proper in “the place where the

consumer signed the subject contract (§ 1692i(a)(2)(A)), or the consumer’s place of

residence at the time the debt collector initiated the action (§ 1692i(a)(2)(B)).”

Elizarov v. Equity Experts LLC,

(E.D. Mich. 2018).

Legal Analysis

{¶13} The ninth allegation in LVNV’s complaint averred that venue was

proper where the action was filed because Culgan “resid[ed] within in the

jurisdiction” of the Crawford County Municipal Court. In his answer, Culgan

admitted the ninth allegation.1 Further, Culgan subsequently filed a motion to

dismiss in which he stated that he resided in Crawford County. Since Culgan lives

1 Culgan did qualify his admission by refusing to acknowledge whether the trial court actually had jurisdiction over this matter. Nonetheless, he still admitted that he resided where LVNV had alleged.

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within the territorial jurisdiction of the Crawford County Municipal Court where

LVNV brought this action, venue is proper under Civ.R. 3(C)(1) and, if applicable,

would also be proper under 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a). Accordingly, his second assignment

of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶14} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of Crawford County Municipal Court is

affirmed.

Judgment Affirmed

MILLER, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/hls

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