Wm. Powell Co. v. Gaskins
Opinion of the Court
The only ground of negligence relied upon i's stated in the petition as follows:
“That the defendant was guilty of carelessness and negligence in this, to wit: that it knew or should have known and was bound to know that the said brass turnings in said crucible were covered with oil and that therefore said vapors and gases were liable to form as aforesaid between the surface of said molten metal and the scum forming on the top thereof, and that an explosion was liable to happen if the plaintiff attempted to skim the surface of the same in the usual manner. That the plaintiff had no knowledge or information about these facts and that the defendant was guilty of carelessness and negligence in not advising the plaintiff thereof.”
It is self-evident that the oil on the brass turnings was consumed or passed off in the form of vapor long before the brass was melted and could not therefore have caused the explosion. There is no evidence tending to prove that ordinary brass, whether clippings or ingots, will in fusion form a scum sufficient to imprison vapors and gases between it and the molten metal.
The plaintiff has therefore failed to sustain the cause of action stated
There are several cases- in the Ohio State Reports in which this duty is thus expressed, but the late case of the Cin. H. & D. Ry. v. Frye, 80 Ohio St. 289 [88 N. E. Rep. 642], the benefit of which the trial judge evidently did not have, places the limit of the master’s duty at ordinary care in providing a safe place and appliances. The great weight of the evidence is opposed to plaintiff’s theory of the ease either as presented by the pleadings or the evidence, and it is even more probable that the accident was caused by the use of a damp skimmer although by no means certain.
It is further claimed that the maxim “Bes ipsa loquitur” applies. A statement of this maxim by Shearman & Redfield on Negligence is cited with approval in the case of Cincinnati Trac. Co. v. Holzenkamp, 74 Ohio St. 379 [78 N. E. Rep. 529; 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 800; 113 Am. St. Rep. 980]:
*657 “Proof of an injury, occurring as the proximate result of an act of the defendant, which would not usually, if done with due care, have injured any one, is enough to make out a presumption of negligence. "When a thing which causes the injury is shown to be under the m-anage-
Counsel for defendant in error say in their brier:
“Defendant introduced the testimony of several witnesses experienced from twenty-five or thirty years’ work, in mixing and handling metals, to the effect that there is a danger to explosion to be apprehended from- the melting of oil brass turnings with pure metal.”
If this were true, the defendant was required to explain why it permitted the use of brass turnings without giving due warning of the danger to plaintiff; but we think the record does not support the statement, nor does it show, by a preponderance of the evidence, from all sources, that the use of oil brass turnings with other brass metal, is liable to cause an explosion. Until some act of the defendant is shown to be the cause of the explosion it is premature to inquire whether negligence should be presumed or proved.
Special instruction No. 5 requested by the defendant does not embrace actual knowledge as well as probable knowledge of the danger-complained of, hence it was not error to refuse it. The judgment will be reversed for error in overruling the motion for a new trial upon the jround that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence, and cause-remanded for a new trial.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.